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Abstract
The new form of digital computational capabilities and internet connectivity continuous to
grow. And introduce a new form of computation that is emerging rapidly with cloud
computing, mobile computing, wearable computing and the Internet-of-Things.
All can be characterized as a class of “Cooperative Distributed Systems” (CDS) in the open
environment. A major drive of the growth involves massive number of people and
organizations, that have been engaged within their all daily life. In this context, users’ privacy
protection has become an essential requirement beyond the traditional approaches. This change
requires a formal treatment of “privacy concern” as a fundamental computation concept in
CDS paradigm.
The objective of this work is to develop a model for “privacy protection” as a foundation to
build a CDS based framework and platform in which various applications allow users to enjoy
the comprehensive services in open environments while protecting their privacy. The
framework has been measured from an Efficiency and Feasibility aspect. To this end, formal
foundation and model of privacy concern has been treated in the aspect of information
management. This proposed framework serves as a base for a practical privacy protection
management in CDS. It includes a privacy-aware agent model and privacy-based platform for
CDS with the ability to support interaction-based privacy protection.
The practical aspects of the proposed framework have been demonstrated by developing an
Interaction-based CDS computational platform.

Keywords
Cooperative Distributed System (CDS), Interaction, Privacy Protection, Information
Categorization, Practical Computation Platform.
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Symbols and Notations
The following is the list of symbols and notation frequently used in this work.
Notation/Symbol

Concept

𝐸

Environment is a CDS-based space where does entities exist

ei

A computation entity in CDS environment
i: is the entity identity

Ii

Set of information that is owned by 𝑒𝑖
i: is the entity identity

𝑂i

Set of operations that is owned by 𝑒𝑖
i: is the entity identity

𝐸𝑖,𝑘

Exposure Boundary of Ii,k that includes entities for which sharing
Ii,k can take place without causing privacy concern.
i: is the entity identity
k: is the information identifier

𝐼 𝑆 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , ej )

𝐼𝑖,𝑘 is Sensitive in relation with ej from ei perspective
i: is the entity identity that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that does not belong to 𝐸𝑖,𝑘
k: is the information identifier

𝑜̿ (I exp , I Shar , I imp )
̃
𝑜̿ (I x1
, I aux )
S(Ii,k , ej )

Executing Operation (o) on explicit information I exp to transform
the implicit information to explicit form of I imp
Preventing/Neutralizing Execution of operation (𝑜) on I x1 given the
auxiliary information I aux
Sharing Ii,k with ej
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that receives Ii,k
k: is the information identifier

D(Ii,k , ej )

Disclosure of Ii,k to ej
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that Ii,k is disclosed to
k: is the information identifier

𝑂̂𝑗𝑖,𝑘

Non-Authorized operations in 𝑂𝑗 that can be applied on Ii,k
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
ix

j: is the entity identifier that Ii,k is disclosed to
k: is the information identifier
𝑂̂𝑗𝑖

All possible non-authorized operations in relation with ej
i: is the entity identifier that owns the information
j: is the entity identifier that can receive information from 𝑒𝑖

𝑖,𝑘
̂ i,k
Privacy Violation of ei by ej disobeying the agreement θi,j between
PV(ej , Ii,k , O
j , 𝜃𝑖,𝑗 )
ei and ej by executing a non-authorized operations belonging to
̂ i,k
O
j on Ii,k

PP(ej , (PS(Ii )), 𝑂̂𝑗 ) Privacy protection of ei when Ii is the space and 𝑂̂𝑗 is all possible
non-authorized operations in ej
μ

Privacy Protection Mechanism

μ̿

Applying privacy protection mechanism

PPL(ej , Ii , μ)

PPL: probability of privacy protection of e𝑖 using μ protection
mechanism in interaction with ej

𝐼𝑃

Interaction protocol

𝑅∗

Participating Entities in an interaction protocol

𝐼𝑖𝑠

All sensitive information in e𝑖 in relationship with entities in 𝑅 ∗

𝑆𝑀

Sequences of messages in an interaction protocol

𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡

Sub-sequences of a sequence
q: Sequence identifier
t: sub-sequence identifier

𝑜
𝑠𝑠𝑞,𝑡

All operations of a sub-sequence
q: Sequence identifier
t: sub-sequence identifier

𝑜 (𝑀)
𝑠𝑠
̿ 𝑞,𝑡

Execution of operations of a subsequence
q: Sequence identifier
t: sub-sequence identifier

𝜇𝑖,𝑘

Protection Operation in a computation entity that is applied for
protecting 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 that is classified as sensitive

x
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Introduction

The computing innovation has been rapidly accelerated over the last decade. The
computation has evaluated from colossal machines to the ever-present digital era that is
characterized by technologies that involves a massive number of people and organizations.
In this new era of technology has engaged a vast number of smart objects and its
applications in the new area of computation known as Internet-of-Things (IoT).
Consciously, a significant part of human life will be exposed and coxswained by
computation systems. This raise the flag of the privacy concern of individuals personal
information privacy that might reveals the extent of which there could be a risk to privacy
concerns. The personal information privacy has been introduced in different areas and
investigated from many different aspects. The focus in this chapter the privacy model, and
its’ issues and model has been demonstrated and how they the privacy protection has been
formally modeled.

Cooperative Distributed System and Privacy Concerns
In the new computation evolution more entities increasingly interconnected, intricate and
quickly changing world. People and businesses are engaging with various applications and
because of this, it is envisioned that a significant part of our lives will be steered by
computation systems in near future. According to the survey that has been done by Cisco
[25] they have predicted that 50 billion new internet-connected will be made in IoT by
2020 as a result of a major advancement in Information and Communication Technology.
Figure 1. Growth of ‘things’ connected to the Internet shows that, in 2008 the number of
the interconnected entities that are equipped with internet connectivity surpassed the
population globally [71]. The development of computation environments that delivering
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services to people and businesses, the privacy become a major challenge in such
environments [68], [10].

Figure 1. Growth of ‘things’ connected to the Internet
The evolution of the Distributed Systems has introduced a form of computation that steered
the involvement and the significant impact of the information technology on people's daily
lives which is the Cooperative Distributed Systems (CDS).
CDS is an important class of distributed systems. Where it is consisting of entities that are
able to exercise a degree of authority in sharing their capabilities. This characteristic is very
desirable in designing systems for many applications domains, such as learning,
manufacturing engineering and virtual environments. In CDS, entities are autonomous selfinterested interact on behalf of their principals. Entities exercise some degree of authority
in share their capabilities and require the computation capability of other entities in the
environment to help them to achieve their goal. In the process of interaction and engaging,
information exchange among participant entities. The exchanged information is collected
by many processes and devices and hence has brought increased risks regarding the
concerns on one’s privacy. Information about people is gathered through many service
providers, stored in various infrastructures, analyzed and reported for further objectives
[7]. In such, the information is manipulated towards extracting and disseminating the
information to other parties or serving various interests [14]. In particular, in open
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environments, it would be a strong assumption that entities in the environment will have a
degree of respect for the privacy of others.
Open environment refers to environments that consist of various autonomous selfinterested entities which have each of the entities is capable to exercises a capability of
achieving a service. In the open environment there are no global knowledge about who
does exist, what are their capability, and when and where they do exist. Since they have
the capability over their activity then they are dynamically participant.
The computation in distributed heterogeneous environments that are modeled as CDS
occurs during interaction between entities, where the information is shared. This entails
capturing privacy at the computation level [7]. This view is contrary to the traditional
approaches towards privacy through which the application filters the computation solutions
based on predefined rules [6],[37]. The privacy models can be classified into two main
categories: rule-based approaches and architectural-based approaches [10].

Privacy

solution models that evolve from rule-based approaches are typically designed for stable,
low variant environments such as Privacy Policy for Social Networks. These approaches
mainly concentrate on applying rules onto information that is collected during the process
of sharing. Due to the open environment assumption in many applications of CDS, the rulebased approaches [18] are not sufficient [10],[70]. Information processing has been the
engine of extracting information by applying operations on it. This information is not
necessarily captured in rule-based privacy models. Furthermore, since the rules and
policies can impose limitation of the design and dynamism of the environments, many open
CDS environments cannot adopt these perspectives on privacy.
Among architectural-based privacy solutions are anonymization techniques [8][14][16],
privacy utility trade off mechanisms, [7] , [74] , social tradeoffs and proxy-based privacy
protection [66]. In this context, the anonymization techniques are limited to particular
settings that include a trusted information collector entity and non-continuous information
dissemination processes that are not adequate for open CDS environments [19]. The work
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in [39] illustrates that privacy utility trade off models do not necessarily reflect the
preferences that each entity might have over their privacy. The utility tradeoff mechanisms
have been applied in contexts such as smart power grid in which privacy is reduced to
limited access to individualized signal from the aggregated view of the collected signal
[62]. These models also evolved with approaches for measuring the risk of privacy
concerns. Such risk adheres to the execution of operations that causes privacy concern, but
it can measure the probability of the entity’s information being used [9] . In all cases, the
limitation of the proposed models indicates the lack of adequate privacy model for CDS.
It is noteworthy that privacy is correlated with the interaction aspects of computation
systems. This asserts that privacy is a computation concept that is related to the interaction
process and can be adequately addressed by interaction protocols. For instance, if a specific
entity can reach solution by acquiring the capabilities of entity the devised interaction
protocol for such engagement has to coordinate the pertinent activities with However,
during this engagement, may exploit the information as part of the messages in the
interaction protocol and thus could result in privacy concern for. Capturing privacy as a
concept in interactions still adheres to the mechanism of interaction as well as finding
solutions that may not be conducive to privacy concerns for the participant entities.

Privacy: Concepts, Issues and Models
Privacy is an ethical, a social and a legal concept that has gained in many various
definitions. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines privacy as “the state of being alone: the
state of being away from other people” while the Oxford Dictionary defines it as “the state
in which one is not observed or disturbed by other people”. In all definitions, privacy
becomes an inherent aspect of an environment of multiple people (entities/agents) or a
setting of decentralized entities/agents.
Privacy protection is an essential and desirable aspect of CDS in open environment. The
privacy protection is modeled as the prevention or neutralization of non-authorized
operations execution on information. In an information management model of
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computation, “privacy” contains some specific connotations though in many ways the term
is similar to how it is generally understood. In communication-based interaction among
entities becomes a privacy concern when sensitive information flows outside the entity or
the unit of entities in CDS. Evidently, it will be a more difficult challenge in CDS in
particular when communication-based interactions are applied in open environments.
Motivated by the computational view on privacy, understanding privacy concept that can
be applied in contexts such as CDS requires formal analysis of privacy. The work in [71]
they have introduced formal foundations and model of privacy is developed within the
context of information management. This served as a base for developing a privacy
protection management framework for CDS. It includes a privacy-aware agent model for
CDS platform with the ability to support interaction-based privacy protection. In another
work in [54] proposes a formal approach for capturing privacy in information management
in the context of social networks. However, the analysis stays at formulating the norms and
relationship of the roles, and the concept of privacy is not clearly stated. In addition, the
concept of norms and contexts can be implicit and exist in gray areas when it comes to
social networks [21]. Also, in [56] they have addressed a major challenge of brokering in
open environments is to support privacy. Within the context of brokering, privacy is
modeled in terms of the entities’ ability. Different approaches of privacy models have been
proposed to deal with relevant privacy issues [20][27][37]. However; to our knowledge,
none of these approaches have treated and captured privacy at the computational level
adequate for the CDS environments.
There have been significant efforts towards building a foundation for privacy rights during
digital interactions. This enables an understanding of privacy and adopting the associated
concepts based on practices in information technology law [22][23]. Many countries have
enacted laws and legislations to protect people’s privacy. For instance, the Canadian law
has several legal acts that oblige service providers and consumers to be responsible on
respecting privacy as a right for people. Canadian Information Privacy Act and Access to
information are among these legal supports. Furthermore, some privacy models were
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motivated by the supporting legal scenarios and rules [5]. Due to limitations on the setting
of the rules and scenarios, employing these models impose closed assumption on the
environment.

Scope of the thesis
A key objective of this work is to conduct a deep analysis of “privacy” and to develop a
privacy protection model and computation concepts of privacy concerns. For this reason,
this dissertation utilizes the formal model to extend the privacy protection framework for
CDS-based applications [71] because of the need for a practical privacy protection solution
that can carry on the privacy concern in the open environment where the participant entities
are not predictable and are not predefined.
In many cases privacy is studied and treated in conjunction or within the context of
“security” and “trust”. Although practically these concepts might be directly related, within
this thesis, however, our focus is on analyzing the foundation of privacy and developing a
fundamental model as computation concept in the CDS paradigm. Our belief is privacy is
an intrinsic concept. In this work, privacy is viewed within the context of managing
information manipulation, in particular “sensitive” information, within a given exposure
boundary, for given security and trust measurements. In this respect, “security”
mechanisms are concerned with the truthfulness of the communication within the areas of
confidentiality, integration and availability, and “trust” is defined as degree of belief of
reliability among entities in a particular context. This direction makes the principle
foundations of our findings expandable to model and address situations where security and
trust are involved.
Additionally, the major contribution of this work is its focus on the practicality aspects of
the privacy protection framework for open environments. The main target indifferent
perspectives to study and analyze the privacy protection management framework [71] from
a different perspective. The focus in this work is to handle the practical aspects of the
framework principles in terms of feasibility and efficiency.
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This framework is applied in the Content Net Protocol (CNP) interaction protocol, which
captures all the privacy concern aspects that can arise during the interaction and transforms
the interaction protocol into a privacy-based interaction protocol. The practicality of the
framework when applying the CNP interaction protocol needs to be considered to maintain
the original behavior of the interaction protocol after the privacy protection mechanisms
extension. However, in this work the original interaction operation of the interaction
protocol has not been substituted. Yet, the operation of the interaction protocol has only
been extended with privacy protection operations.

1.3.1Practical Privacy Model
The formal privacy model that is applicable for a CDS [71] was the motivation to extend
it and develop a formal practical treatment of privacy for CDS environments. The proposed
model is used as an analytical tool to evaluate the state of privacy during any entity’s
interaction.
Entities discern their sensitivity of information differently, depends on the recipients of the
information during the interaction. Sensitive information perceived in relation to one entity
might be considered totally non-sensitive to another. Entities tend to not share information
when it is labeled as sensitive. This creates an exposure boundary for entities’ information,
which positions privacy as the state of the exposure boundary of the information.
Information within the exposure boundary is non-sensitive but becomes sensitive when it
exists outside of the exposure boundary.
Information exists in explicit forms. However, it can be classified as implicit information
when it is in conjunction with operations. Operations can retrieve explicit information by
processing the said information. The execution of operations transforms the implicit
information to an explicit form. Through this transformation information might be
transferred to outside of the exposure boundary therefore become sensitive. This implies
that the concern with privacy is about the disclosure of sensitive implicit information. For
example, various IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) [17][31] providers serve their
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consumers by offering them resources, including memory, storage, and computational
power, among others. In many forms of IaaS service delivery models, payment packages
(pay per user) are based on the demands of entities. When the provider is not serving a
higher priority consumer, economical packages receive response from the server. The
advantage of costly packages is the guarantee of service at any time. Hence, serving an
economical plan at the server implicitly implies not having a high priority job. Sharing
scheduling information may enable an entity with a medium priority and resourcedemanding job to acquire the service provider. Frequent preemption for lower priority
consumers may lead to service blocking. This scenario explains that sharing the schedule
is not sensitive when in possession of the scheduler, but it is sensitive whenever shared
with other consumer entities.
In this work, we have provided a practical extension to the original privacy model that
formally captures the concepts and concerns about privacy. Within this model, privacy
concerns, privacy violation and privacy protection are formally explained and the
necessary concepts to develop a framework for privacy protection management are
introduced.

1.3.2 Practical Privacy Protection Management Framework
By employing the proposed privacy model, we established a practical privacy protection
management framework that incorporates privacy protection mechanisms at the interaction
level. Achieving a perfect privacy protection requires a complete knowledge about the
environment. This complete knowledge cannot be attained in open environment since the
is no global knowledge about the existence of other entities. We incorporated a quasiprotection mechanism that can protect privacy with a certain level of probability that is
addressed as Privacy Protection Level (PPL) [71].
The framework captures the information of entities and accordingly evaluates the exposure
boundaries associated to information. Consequently, it identifies the sensitive information
and determines the necessary extension form for privacy protection. Using the PPL
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measure of each mechanism, the PPL of the privacy-based interaction protocol is evaluated
and this enables applications to adopt privacy mechanisms that generate an acceptable level
of PPL at the interaction level. It is proven in this work that this protection can sufficiently
assist at the interaction level.

1.3.3 Privacy-Aware Computation Platform
Capturing privacy protection at the computation platform, will reduces the available
solution choices to those entities that can fulfill the expected privacy requirements. The
quantifiable model for the privacy concept allows for filtering the solutions space based on
the privacy protection measures.
Match works has been devoted to the perspectives of authorization and rule management
within underlying infrastructures [6][17]; privacy related concepts and the challenge with
new technologies [5], taxonomy of privacy affairs [24], [70], privacy categorization and
personally identifiable information [10]; and privacy within the context of information
management, including information collection, information processing and information
dissemination [26][34][35]. There also have been some attempts to formalize the languages
used for privacy policies [5]. The economic mechanisms have been applied in this area as
well with the objective of developing strategies through which privacy protection can be a
dominant strategy [13]. Furthermore, privacy has been a main concern of multi-agent
systems. Agents interact on behalf of their principals, engage in a number of activities and
exchange information, which inevitably raises issues and concerns with regard to privacy
[19].
Our research has contributed to several aspects of these areas, including sharing with
privacy in information management, formalizing privacy concepts, personally identifiable
information, privacy concepts and categorization and privacy within multi-agent systems
and practical implementation in open environments. This work introduces a practical
privacy-aware computation in open Cooperative Distributed Systems that addresses and
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manages privacy at the interaction level. The work also introduces several new original
and novel ideas that contribute to the overall thesis that can be listed as follows:
1) Privacy Model Implementation in the Context of Information Management
A privacy concepts analysis is essential to capturing privacy as a computation concept.
In this work, we have investigated privacy protection within the context of information
management and sensitive information. Our attempts in understanding privacy in this
context have resulted in developing a formal model that delivers a complete view of
privacy protection in information management.
2) Sensitive Information Privacy Management Interaction-Based Engine.
Considering the incomplete knowledge of entities in open CDS environments, privacy
protection is encountered with different uncertainty levels. To deal with this
uncertainty, a probability-based model and utility-based model are applied. The
information privacy protection management engine, which is based on the privacy
protection management framework, enables managing the expected level of privacy
protection within the interactions of entities. The proposed solution for practical
protection of privacy has been congregated within an architectural approach towards
an interaction-based framework for privacy protection in which the privacy protection
mechanisms are applied to interactions as required.
3) Practical Privacy as a Computation Concept.
The privacy concept is practically treated at the interaction level by including privacy
in the computation solution. As a result, the computation has been practically applied
at two levels, partially adopted at as part of the computation entity architecture as well
in the computation platform architecture.
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4) Privacy-Based Interaction Protocol
Applying a privacy protection management framework to the interaction protocols
allows for the identification if privacy concerns in those interactions. The proposed
framework evaluates the messages and sequences of the interaction protocol and
provides adequate protection operations within the interaction protocol that result in a
privacy-based interaction protocol. The extended privacy-based interaction protocol
that is generated by applying the privacy protection management framework can
practically provide privacy protection in situations where knowledge of an entity in the
CDS environment is incomplete. One of the interaction protocols that is utilized within
this framework is Contract Net protocol (CNP). CNP is a negotiation-based interaction
protocol that is designed for distributed problem solving. Due to privacy concerns in
this protocol, we have applied the privacy protection management framework, which
resulted in a privacy-based Contract Net interaction protocol.

Organization of Thesis
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of privacy
in different areas of research. Chapter 3 provides a privacy concern in CDS as a concept,
modeling and management. Subsequently, Chapter 4 proposes a practical privacy
protection management framework. Chapter 5 elaborates on privacy protection aware
model and practical implementation, as well as implementation challenges. Chapter 6
presents the privacy protection platform in the CDS model: application scenarios.
Chapter 8 includes future work and the conclusion of this work is outlined.
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Background and Literature Review

2

The objective in this part is to conduct a literature review and discuss the existing
approaches, research methodology and challenges for protecting privacy issues with a
special focus on implementation practicality associated with Cooperative Distributed
Systems in open environments. These numerous applications allow users to take advantage
of comprehensive services in open environments while protecting their privacy seamlessly.
The more engagements that take place in digital developments, the more privacy concerns
that occur. Based on the findings we will analyze and reflect on some of existing
approaches the deal with privacy concern in CDS. We will compare the results of each of
the papers and how this works can be related to our main research goal. Many disciplines
have addressed privacy in their solutions. However, an adequate privacy models for CDS
environments are still a challenge.

Privacy Protection by The Law
Text Privacy is a multi-disciplinary concept that is mainly tented within Law researches
and legal schemes. Understanding privacy from the perspective of law enables us to
observe and perceive privacy concerns in the context of information management. There
are various views about privacy among different categories of law. One believes privacy is
the product of the modern life where gossips became curiosity while another claim that
privacy is as old as common law [22]. The work in [61] indicates that privacy is often
interpreted as security and it is traded in return for providing security for the society or
individual [23]. The concept of privacy has been studied in four main categories [22]:
•

Common Law

•

Constitutional Law
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•

Statutory Law

•

International Law

Due to dynamic context of privacy, challenge in front of legal scholars is defining privacy
rights which, in many cases are typically abstract and vague [22]. Researchers in legal areas
try to retrieve the potentials of the existing law to propose solutions for protecting privacy
and evaluate Law responses to new subjects such as privacy rights. Traditionally, privacy
was treated as “decisional privacy” which mainly concerns the liberty of decisions about
one’s body and family. Nonetheless, because of the role of technology in spreading
information about people and organizations and the direct effect of privacy in ones’ lives,
it has become the priority in legislative agenda in Congresses. History of privacy rights
indicates multiple stories about people and organizations in which dissemination of
information can directly target individuals’ lives [22].
One of the main achievements in Privacy Law is presenting it as one’s “Rights”. The main
issue in the current technology is the presence of medias that are utilized for circulating
information. Such trend increases the effect of privacy in people’s lives. Therefore,
attorneys typically address privacy rights in the area of “common law”. The objective is to
protect privacy of private lives form unwanted intrusion. Accordingly, there are four type
of intrusion in interaction of people and society [22]:
1. Intrusion upon seclusion and solitude.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.
3. Publicity which exposes people in a false light in public.
4. Appropriation for people’s interests.
As people’s lives are now virtually available among various type of services and data
sources, it would become essential for these services to adapt their solution in alignment
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with common law. However, privacy rights are not limited to common law and people’s
private life. More importantly, privacy concerns are not only about people. It can also be
applied on how machines and software interact which can be addressed in information
privacy. In this section, we try to extract the necessary foundation for privacy interactions
so that we can associate them in general interaction among entities in CDS.
In attempt to identify the interactions that result in privacy violation from law perspective,
four types of violation categories are presented above. Each of which can represent various
circumstances that individuals or machines confront in open environments. For instance,
the first category asserts on respecting people’s solitude and private avocations. This
implies that the actions performed by an entity in its private life are being monitored by
another entity apart from their awareness. This is equivalent to the privacy concerns related
to “information collection” and “information processing”. Currently, digital life is an
inseparable part of individuals’ activities [22]. However, mainly, all the individual’s online
private affairs and activities are usually monitored and recorded by service providers.
Software and machines are installed in many locations to observe and analyze human
interactions. The motivations supporting these systems are tailored to improving business,
security, better consumer support, safety, efficiency and many human perspectives. Yet,
such motivations have brought about and created a tremendous challenge related to privacy
in Cyberspace. Nonetheless, legal efforts are directed to finding solutions that can mitigate
the issue by eliminating unnecessary monitoring and controlling tasks. The second
Category implies the concern of public exposure of information, which might cause
humiliation and embarrassments for individuals [22]. This is due to the sharing an
individual’s information to others without having the necessary consent. This form of
privacy concerns is referred as secondary use whenever a third party is involved. With the
explosion of Internet Media and personal pages in various web sites, individuals experience
levels of disconcertion when their information is used in other contexts. Personal
information is excessively spreading among Internet services and in noticeable amount of
cases; it has been disseminated to other providers or publicly exposed.
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Similar to the second category, the third category of intrusion occurs when disclosing false
information entails the attraction of unnecessary attention to individuals [22]. Suppose in
a reputation system built for auctions, an entity gets false negative feedback; it is without
doubt that such falsification impact further future activities with this entity. Spreading false
information about capabilities and availability of a service provider in a grid environment
can forge the scheduling mechanism and hence may overload a provider or disrupt the
whole scheduling system.
The last category of intrusion discusses the appropriation of exposing individuals’ interest
information [22]. Due to the possibility of extracting personal information about people by
processing their interests in various subjects, interest information become sensitive. Given
the growth of targeting advertisement, interest information is valuable to advertisers. This
could exhibit levels of privacy concerns when the interest information is not appropriate.
As argued in [22], the challenge in investigating privacy violation is distinguishing the
discussed aforementioned categories. For simplicity, they are addresses respectively as 1)
intrusion, 2) disclosure, 3) false light and 4) appropriation. In spite of the similarity among
these categories, they have characteristics that assist in separating the concepts. For
instance, in intrusion and disclosure, existence of secret information is part of the scenario.
In disclosure and false light, the publicity is the main element. However, in false light,
falsified information or fiction differentiates it from disclosure. Appropriation typically
involves in providing advantages for the owner of information [22].
Borrowing the intrusion categories in common low, similar concerns exist in cyber space.
Among them are: “Breach of Confidentiality”, “Defamation”, “Infliction of emotional
distress”, “privacy of home” [22] and “privacy in computing technology”.
Breach of Confidentiality”: this term commonly is used to define the revealing of patients’
and client’s information [22]. In this context, the patient is the consumer entity and the
doctor is the service provider. If the service provider breaches the confidentiality of the
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information, it has disseminated the information to a third party without having the consent
of the consumer.
Defamation refers to disrupting individuals’ reputation by false information [22], where
infliction of emotional distress is related to the emotional discomfort that individuals
experience when their sensitive information is shared in social networks and similar
communication mediums.
The Privacy of home concept addresses the physical resident of individuals. This is
associated with ones’ solitude and private affair that are well established in common law.
This type of privacy concern can infiltrate to individuals’ digital interactions when their
information is spread across various sectors in machine.
Privacy in computing technology refers to the evolving relationship between the existing
information and the information ownership by storing, processing, and distributing information
[79]. Privacy concerns exist wherever uniquely identifiable data relating to a person or persons
are collected and stored. In many cases these concerns refer to how data are collected, stored,
and associated.

Privacy Protection in Information Management
Privacy introduced as: “the freedom from surveillances”, “the protection of one’s
reputation”, “protecting one from searches and interrogation”, and “not selling one’s
information” [24], Privacy has been viewed from multiple perspective. Other researchers
considered privacy interims: the limited access to self [28], the right to be alone [66]. Other
views, based on “secrecy” [61] in which in many legal communities were accepted as
definition for privacy. “control over personal information” [11], Intimacy and Personhood
[65]. Privacy also viewed as “the condition of being protected from unwanted access by
others” [65]. In [18] they define the privacy in context of the right to determine “to what
extent information about people or companies is communicated to others”.
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In Cooperative Distributed Systems (CDS) perspectives privacy can be viewed in the
context of “information management” [71]. The information in CDS environments the
entities are autonomous, and they are able to interact and share information in behave of
the information owner, in which this information can be processed or disseminated.
Considering the setting of the entities in CDS, which are autonomists and selfinterestedness, and autonomy of the entities in CDS settings, that might result a privacy
concern.
The information management can be categorized based on the operations or the actions
applied to the information including:
-

Information Collection: Applying operations for gathering information from
multiple sources such as the online (profiling, banking, tracking), collection of task
specification and requirement.

-

Information Processing: Applying operations for manipulating information such as
aggregation, integration and identification.

-

Information Dissemination: Applying operations for distributing information to
multiple entities.

2.2.1 Personal Identifiable Information (PII)
Information or attributes such as SIN numbers and personal number can be used to identify
entities. Some attributes can be used in combination of others to identify an entity; for
example, combination of date of birth, gender, name and zip code. The attributes that
directly identify the entities are called “identified” and the attributes that can [implicitly]
result in identifying an entity are called “Personally Identifiable Information” (PII). In this
context, attribute disclosure happens when the value of identifiable information reveals the
identity of the entity. And, identity disclosure happens when the identifiable information
is a bridge to associate sensitive attributes to an entity [43]. The challenge is that due to
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advances in technology and information processing which can convert the non-PII
attributes to PII attributes at higher scale, it becomes not possible to directly identify PII
[59].
Entities’ incomplete knowledge in open environments originates the concern on the
operations that might be applied on shared information. Combining information by
applying operations to extract new information is known as a secondary use problem. This
could lead to privacy concerns when the retrieved information is sensitive, and the
information includes the identifier to the owner of the sensitive information. This issue
which is functionally equivalent to the PII problem is due to implicitly extracting
information from identifiable information that is shared [44],[70]. Resolving the PII
problem has been investigated in three approaches; reduction, expansion and PII2.0.
Reduction focuses more on “identified” attributes. For example, COPPA (Children Online
Privacy Protection Act) concerns only with information about “identified person”. In fact,
the “identifiable” concept has been reduced from this approach. In the Expansion approach,
the identifiable information is considered as critical as identified information. However, as
almost any kind of information can be attributed to an identified entity, and from the
practicality point of view, this approach is considered as a flaw. This is the result of treating
the identified and identifiable information equally [44].
PII 2.0 is an approach for privacy in interactions that deals with PII problem through the
perspective of risk analysis. Although, there are large amount of identifiable information,
that could implicitly retrieve new identified information, not all of them have a high risk
of privacy concerns. PII 2.0 introduces the risk of revealing information as a relative
probability measure. If the risk of a set of identifiable information is high, then information
should not be shared [44]. The risk of interaction is probabilistic view of the occurrence of
associated negative impact of privacy concerns on the entity. It allows decision-making
processes to evaluate the interaction and the sharing information with regards to the risk of
interaction, gain and the possible drawback that might affect the entity.
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In new forms of resolutions for PII complications, there are rule-based and standard-based
approaches. Typically, the rule-based approaches are convenient when the area of social
and technological development have reached a fairly stable state [57][1]. Due to the
dynamic and open nature of environments in CDS, the rule-based solutions to resolve PII
are not adequate approaches as privacy protection in distributed systems.
Privacy concern become a critical aspect during the era of the distributed systems, where
the setting of its’ environment is decentralized. The Distributed Systems can be categorized
in more granularity classification that in this work address some of this classification that
related to privacy models.

Privacy in Distributed Systems
Within the arena of distributed systems, privacy is a concern when the setting of the
environment is decentralized. Distributed Systems can be classified in more granular
categories that we address a few of them and discussed the related privacy models.

2.3.1 Privacy and Security in Authorization Framework
Most of the time Privacy and security have been similarly treated and interchangeable used.
In which, the privacy has been misunderstood and be treated in the context of access control
of entity. Frequently, the privacy has investigated, in the scoop of the information
management, at the security authorization mechanisms [18][69]. Despite security
mechanisms that are targeted to maintaining confidentiality, integrity and availability of
the communication among entities, privacy concerns are about manipulating the
information that could have been securely communicated [shared]. The efforts within
security mechanisms are geared towards assuring the information is to be only accessible
by the desired entity, and the entities’ communication is not compromised with a third
party. However, security mechanisms may not address the manipulation of information
among entities. For instance, the communication with a search engine can have the required
security measures and the integrity of the communication is supported. Nonetheless, the
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information that is retrieved by the search engine after applying operations on the collected
information is not treated in security mechanisms. This indicates that the nature of security
mechanisms is not sufficient to resolve privacy concerns. Privacy concerns are categorized
on the control over “how” information is collected, processed and disseminated. Typically,
the security mechanisms are applied on the established connection between at least two
entities. If the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the communicated information
are satisfied, that interaction is secured. Nevertheless, that does not guarantee that there is
not privacy concerns with the interaction.
Diverse set of models has been applied on authorization in CDS such as SAML, Akenti,
PERMIS, Shibboleth, VOMS, XACML, GT4 [18] and [69]. The objective of these models
is to provide authorization platforms that protect information from unauthorized access.
However, these models are still incapable of addressing privacy in relation with “how”
information is processed and “flow” within entities. Additionally, the solutions do not
provide privacy protection techniques for the collection and the dissemination of
information. The work in [69] addresses privacy as part of the populated rules for the
authorization mechanism. However, the model does not capture the identifiable
information that implicitly can lead to privacy concerns. In addition, the setting of the
applied model in this mechanism is assumed to include trusted entities to govern the
privacy rules. Such setting is not necessarily attainable in all CDS environments and the
privacy model cannot be applied.

2.3.2 Privacy Protection in Multiple Data Sources
Data source providers provide aggregated view of the information that is collected from
people, business, and organizations. Typically, this information is published for research
collaboration purposes and data analysis for a particular problem. However, the process of
information collection can be pursued if exclusively, the aggregated information is
published. Disclosing information such as the participation of an entity in the information
collection process can lead to privacy concern for the entity. Many public data sources
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contain information that might be common across multiple data sources. Linking the
available information across multiple data sources is based on their common information
can identify individuals and disclose sensitive information which can be captured as
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure [47],[27],[8]. These concepts depend on
contextual variables, amount of released data, level of the knowledge of adversary [48],
[57]. Given this categorization, there are different privacy models that address specific
aspects of privacy. Models such as K-Anonymity [16], l-Diversity [8], SIPPA [57], tcloseness [34] and Differential Privacy [27] aim to resolve identity or attribute disclosure.
The typical setting of anonymization mechanisms includes a trusted information collector
that collects the information and disseminates aggregated information to other entities
[20],[27][20],[34]. There are assumptions in this setting that the information collector is a
trusted party and the process of information collection and dissemination happens in noncontinuous fashion [38]. These mechanisms are tailored towards protecting sensitive
information such as participation of entities in information collecting process. The
adversary consumes the aggregated information in conjunction with previous knowledge
to retrieve sensitive information about an entity. Evidently, not all CDS applications can
adhere to the setting of anonymization mechanism. Furthermore, because of possibilities
of attacks such as complementary attack in K-Anonymity [47], these approaches are not
applicable in CDS. In complementary attack, the adversary accesses the published
anonymized information in multiple sources and combines them all. This in many cases
circumvents the protection that is applied.

2.3.3Privacy in Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) is a Constraint Satisfaction Problem
(CSP) in which the variables and constraints are distributed among distributed multiple
entities (i.e., Agents). Those agents need to determine values for a set of variables such that
the cost of a set of constraints over the variables is satisfied and thus optimized (as either
minimized or maximized). In other words, CSP is about finding a consistent assignment of
values to variables [43][52]. The DisCSP framework was a focal point of several areas
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such as Artificial Intelligent and agent Technology. In DisCSP, privacy principles have
been identified at four level [8] namely: 1) The Agent, 2) The Topology, 3) The Constraint
and 4) The Decision. At the Agent level, the algorithm has to guarantee that no agent can
learn the identity of any other agent unless they are in sharing coordination constraints. At
the topology level the algorithm should not allow any agent to learn about the constraints
and cycles of other agents. For example, the constraint of an agent for specific resource is
sensitive information that should be kept private. The Constraint level is similar to topology
level with focus on constraint and its relations. Finally, at the decision level, the algorithm
has to protect the outcome of any decision that the agent makes. The solution in [15]
expands the Distributed Pseudotree Optimization Procedure (DPOP) algorithm [6] by
adding privacy metrics. This algorithm creates a Depth First Search Tree (DFS tree) out of
entities. Each entity interacts only with their neighbors. Entities send their constraint to
their parent, and the root node (leader) accordingly solves the problem and sends it back to
others. The contribution of the solution in [15] anonymizes the construction of DFS. Nodes
have code names for interactions. Moreover, the leader in each round is anonymous and
given the associated assumptions, the approach can guarantee the required privacy levels.
However, the settings in these environments are limited to the topology that is defined in
priori and the maximum distance between two nodes in the environment which is known
for the used algorithm. Evidently, the adoption of the solutions in DisCSP in CDS will not
inherent to all settings of application. Furthermore, in this algorithm, it is possible for a
malicious entity to forge the coordination information in attempt to be the leader which
may perform actions that can cause privacy concern.
In addition, there are attempts to resolve privacy concerns in DCOP (Distributed Constraint
Optimization Problem) [63][64]. DCOP consists of entities that set and control the
evaluation of variables. Entities decide which evaluation of the variables has more benefit
for them. However, the problem’s setting is based on the assumption that all entities are
aware of the constraints of other entities, and only the evaluation of the variables is
sensitive information [64]. Additionally, privacy solutions in DCOP are derived from an
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information theoretic perspective [64] and do not necessarily reflect on the privacy concern
in setting in CDS environment.

Privacy in Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Multi Agent System (MAS) is one of the computational models applied in CDS in which
the computational entities operate in a decentralized control fashion and modeled as
autonomous entities known as agents. MASs are designed for autonomous actions and
flexible interaction [14] where it addresses autonomy by drawing on concepts and
techniques from artificial intelligence. Agents act on behalf their principals and engage in
various interactions that might require in many cases the exchange of personal information
[39]. This, as such makes privacy management an essential aspect.
Privacy management approaches in MASs has been categorized into three categories: (i)
policy-based, (ii) privacy utility tradeoff and (iii) social relationships. For instance, the
work in [34] is a policy-based framework in which a trusted broker compares the policies
of providers and consumers and decides on their compatibility. The broker resumes any
interaction only if the compared policies are compatible. However, the approach relies on
the assumption that the broker is a trusted entity [39]. The Privacy Enhancement Agent
(PEA) [33] is a similar approach that uses P3P (Platform for Privacy Protection)[51]
retrieve the P3P policies, validate the compatibility of policies and accordingly decide on
the possibility of further engagement in any interaction.
Other approaches adopt the ontological comparison of policies that are described and
represented using the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [67]. Once the conditions are
accepted among both parties, the consumer shares the information. In similar approaches,
the rules are semantically analyzed, and the access control mechanism are incorporated
with the privacy rules [6][37]. However, in these models, there is a lack of mechanisms
which obliged entities to comply with the commitments [[39].
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One of the major challenges in privacy management is to identify and measure the risk of
sharing the information. To deal with such issue, “Privacy- Utility Tradeoff”’ mechanisms
were proposed [7][39]. This work is based on calculating the information gain of shared
information. The elements such as history of two sides of interaction, social aspects of
interaction, relevancy of requested information to the offered service has not been
considered in these mechanisms. This motivated the complementary approaches that
applying concepts of trust and intimacy in measuring risk and utility. The challenge with
these approaches is the difficulty of validating these metrics, in particular in CDS
environments [39]. The utility trade off mechanisms evolved with approach of measuring
the risk of privacy concerns. The risk of interaction adheres to execution of operations that
might cause privacy concern, but it can measure the probability of the entity’s data getting
used [9].

Privacy Protection in Cooperative Distributed Systems
Many solutions are proposed for computations for which the environment is modeled as
CDS. Typically, the prospects of these models are tailored towards particular setting of the
environment where a certain type of information is exchanged in the interaction of entities.
Adopting these solutions for many applications of CDS imposes limitations and
assumption of their environments. In the following we address some of the related works
within this area.

2.5.1 Privacy in Auction Mechanisms
Auctions are subclass of markets that restrict the governing rules of the market in which
buyers and seller are trading goods and services. Auction mechanism design is the attempt
to manipulate the rules of the auction in order to achieve specific goals [40]. In auction
configurations, an auctioneer applies the rules of the auction mechanism and rewards the
winner(s). In this setting, it is possible that a faulty or malicious auctioneer forges the
auction or exploits the bidding values [52]. When bidders submit their bids to the
auctioneer, it is possible that the auctioneer exploits the bidding value of the winner for the
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future auctions. For example, if the winner’s bid is $900 and the second bid value is $600,
then the auctioneer can start the auction from $900 since it has the knowledge that at least
one entity will bid with this value [52]. It is very desirable and an important aspect of
bidding activities to assure the bidders about the safety of the auction with respect to
privacy concerns.
To deal with this issue some approaches were proposed in the literature [43] [52]. The work
in [52] an Auction Issuer (AI) is introduced which is a passive entity that has no direct
communication with bidders and limits the auctioneer ability to only access the relevant
information. The AI in this architecture computes the auction and presents it back to the
auctioneer. This restricts the auctioneer to be able only to know the identity of the winners
only and not the value of the bids. However, this protocol cannot guarantee the privacy of
entities when collusion takes place between the AI and auctioneer. The (AI) entity is
designed to control the access of auctioneer entity to sensitive information.

2.5.2 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis in interactions of entities has played a significant role in many privacy
solutions. Identifying risk levels in a system provides meaningful measures which can be
applied to processes that could mitigate the risk [36]. Risk in general is a degree of belief
on occurrence of an event with undesired outcomes. The risk of interaction refers to level
of belief on incidents and events in which sharing information in interaction led to privacy
concerns. There are various models to capture the risk of interactions. Some of them adhere
to analyzing the interactions in terms of 1) Information Sensitivity, 2) Information
Receiver, 3) Information Usage [67] Other approaches use fuzzy logic to capture the
effecting variables on risk of interactions. The work in [4] utilizes hierarchical fuzzy
inference system to address the risk of interaction. It measures and evaluates the relevancy
of the requested information; trust level, cost and criticality of the shared information, type
of intended operation, the content of the agreement, sensitivity of information and
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information gain in a given interaction. Using these variables, a hierarchical fuzzy system
can be developed to measure the risk of interaction.

2.5.3 Targeting Advertisement
Targeting advertisement systems apply Online Behavioral Advertisement (OBA)
techniques to promote more relevant commercial contents to users. Because of capability
interdependency among entities of these systems, they need to exchange information such
as user’s interest that might be sensitive. In this context, privacy becomes a major challenge
[76][65]. One of the approaches in addressing privacy concerns is through Adnostic [76]
In Adnostic system, privacy is modeled as a tuple that is expressed in terms of the following
attributes <consumer’s identity, consumer’s request>. The disclosure of any relevant
attribute may result in privacy concern to consumers. In this system, it was presumed that,
providers are able of delivering their capability without knowing the identity of consumers.
The objective of the model is to protect consumer’s privacy by introducing a trusted entity
called Trusted Third Party, (TTP). Providers and consumers are defined as roles, which
can be played interchangeably. A provider has to present a list of options to the consumer
whose in turn consumer selects the preferred information which will be considered as the
request information. However, consumers encrypt the list of options including the one that
was tagged as the chosen option. When providers receive the encrypted list, they only know
that an item is selected but they are now aware which one is chosen [76]. In Adnostic, it is
assumed that there is a time period where providers have to wait before providing their
capabilities. In this time, they need to collect all encrypted lists of options sent by
consumers, aggregate all these lists and submit them back to the TTP at the end of waiting
period. The TTP is capable of decrypting the list and thus delivers the decrypted list to the
provider. The provider’s access to an aggregated list of requests does not show which
identity has chosen which item in the list. Another approach in targeting advertisement is
through decoupling the request and identity utilizing ElGamal crypto systems [2].
However, in these approaches, the protection mechanism can be circumvented if entities
collide [44]. Furthermore, the only sensitive information in this model is the combination
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of consumer’s identity and their requests. This makes the system incapable of managing
various settings in CDS environments.

2.5.4 Privacy Protection Management in CDS
In the message-based form of interactions, entities exchange information through
autonomous and self-interested entities, and thus their privacy becomes a concern. In CDS,
solutions are accomplished through the participation of several entities where each has only
part of the solution. In [56] a generic brokering has been introduced, where the brokering
architecture has been defined to enable cooperation under a desired level of privacy
protection in CDS. For which, an agent-based brokering framework that provides
seamlessly coordination solutions and presents additional privacy opportunities to various
participants within cooperative distributed systems has introduced. Where the privacy
protection has been treated as a design issue in developing brokering services for
cooperative distributed systems. In such a setting the privacy mainly driven by the broker,
in such setting the broker is an entity that is able to process, aggregate and disseminate
information. However, the approach relies on the assumption that the broker is a trusted
entity [39][56]. This work will not be applicable to be applied since the broker entity is
exposed to all of the entities information, and that make it unacceptable if the broker entity
compromised by and adversary or the information has been aggregate the shared
information for future purpose that can breach the privacy of the information owner. Where
in the work [71] consider the privacy protection as a computational aspect. In which, the
privacy protection management framework at the interaction level as a computation
element by expanding the structure of the entity to include privacy protection management
that convert the entity to be a privacy aware entity. Applying the privacy protection
management framework will capture the privacy concerns at the interaction level. Since
the interaction is governed by the interaction protocol, the framework captured even the
privacy concerns that can be yield through the interaction operations. It is proven in this
work that protection at the interaction protocol is sufficient for protecting privacy in CDS
environments. Also, the generated privacy-based interaction protocol has quantifiable
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privacy protection level that allows entities to interact with a certain degree of protection
[71].

Summary
In [71] formally explained that legitimate acceptable solutions at the computation that
require the inclusion of privacy resolution in-addition to problem solving and coordination
has been introduced. However, the work was a definition to the privacy protection of a
privacy concern and a computation solution has been proposed with a privacy protectionbased interaction protocol utilizing the proposed framework and extending it with the
practically aspect in the context of open environment, in which the proposed framework
will be sufficiently adequate for the open environment.
Despite the variety of works carried out toward protecting privacy in different disciplines,
an adequate practical privacy model for CDS environment is lacking. Within the context
of information management, privacy can be categorized as information collection,
information processing, information dissemination and invasion. One of the challenges of
the privacy concept is the identification, which is referred to manipulating information in
order to retrieve and relate “sensitive information” to entities. However, information may
have different risks for the identification. Identified information can directly lead to the
risk of inferring and identifying an entity. The setting of these two categories is different,
which makes it not possible to differentiate among them.
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3

Privacy Concerns in CDS: Concepts and Models

Privacy is an area of research that includes a variety of applied models that are automated
in different applications. Some applied models require settings that impose limitations on
the design of entities in the environment and subsequently create a closed environment.
This requires employing models that can capture privacy as a computational concept which
necessitates a formal analysis of privacy. Privacy in an information management context
enables modeling in a computation context where the flow of sensitive information
becomes a privacy concern. This chapter includes a formal analysis of privacy and
modeling in the context of information management.

CDS: An Agent-based Model
CDS is a class of systems in which entities are autonomous, self-interested, able to operate
on some functions locally, and exercise some authority in sharing their capabilities. Goals
in these settings refer to a state in which the actions of the entity - including physical and
mental reasoning. Within CDS, entities have interdependencies through which some goals
may be unattainable through the abilities of an individual entity. They may require
coordinating activities with other entities to reach an individual or collective goal state
[32][56][71]. This coordination is a class of solutions that provides structure and
mechanisms to the system to address interdependency issues. “Structure” refers to the
entities’ pattern of communication and decision-making related to coordination.
“Mechanisms” are a composition of decision points, coordinated control and interaction
devices directed to resolve problems with interdependencies [32]. An essential
characteristic of CDS is the distribution of control which prevents outside parties from
controlling the strategies of entities. This supports the concept that every entity in CDS is
part of the solution in which participating entities’ goals are achieved.
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Figure 2: Computation Entity in CDS
This dissertation focuses on entities of CDS in an agent-based model. Entities can be
modeled as CIR agents Figure 2. These agents are organized by knowledge, problem
solving, interaction, and communication capabilities [32]. “Knowledge” is the entity’s
mental state about the world, a concept often missed in examples of CDS environments. In
these examples, global knowledge is distributed among all entities. “Problem solving”
refers to the entity’s ability to identify the class of their goals, categorizing sub-goals,
applying required actions to the goals’ state, and determining the type of interdependency.
“Interaction” is the authority and capability of the entity in the pursuit of mechanisms that
can resolve interdependency problems. Interaction mechanisms are steered by protocols
that manage engagement between entities. The “communication” layer is responsible for
packaging and transferring messages in the desired languages. [32] Communication-based
interaction, or message-based interaction, is essential when the entities’ knowledge is
incomplete, and they are obligated to exchange messages. There are interdependency issues
with settings in CDS, and as such reaching a solution requires the interaction of multiple
autonomous entities. This indicates that computation in CDS takes place within
interactions among entities.
In the open structure of CDS environments, entities’ availability and participation is
unpredictable and there is therefore no control over their behavior or the design they adopt.
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New forms of computation emerging in Grid, cloud, and mobile computing can be modeled
as open CDS. Cloud paradigms such as IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS are used in many application
domains

medical,

health,

financial,

entertainment,

education,

business,

and

communication.

Privacy Concern Analysis and Model
Privacy concerns occur in environments with multiple autonomous entities. This is a
natural characteristic of the environments where autonomous entities exchange
information. Let 𝐸, be the decentralized environment of autonomous self-interested
entities 𝑒𝑁
𝐸 = {𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑁 }
In the context of information management, entity 𝑒𝑖 can be modeled in terms of information
𝐼𝑖 and operations 𝑂𝑖 . At the lowest granularity level, an entity can be shown as:
𝑒𝑖 = < 𝑂𝑖 , 𝐼𝑖 >, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 𝑖.
Where
𝐼𝑖 = {𝐼𝑖,1 , … , 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝐼𝑖,𝑁 }
1 ≤𝑡≤𝑁
and
𝑂𝑖 = {𝑂𝑖,1 , … , 𝑂𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝑂𝑖,𝑁 }.
Entities have various states [24]. Information about an entity can be viewed as the state of
an entity. In many cases, an entity desires to protect a certain state from being exposed to
the outside environment; or to protect part of the information being exposed to a specific
part of the environment. This information can be referred to as “sensitive information”.
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The flow of sensitive information can vary within a context of a group of entities in the
environment. Family is an example of a group in society in which individuals have
distinctive approaches to how information flows between participant entities and outside
the group. As a result, for any given state of an entity, there is a boundary for exposure 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 .
This suggests that privacy is the state of exposure boundary of an entity’s state with the
outside environment 𝐸. There exists an exposure boundary for any information, including
those entities that are considered to be inside the boundary
𝐸𝑖,𝑘 = {𝑒𝑖,1 , … , 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , … 𝑒𝑖,𝑁 }, (𝐸𝑖,𝑘 ⊂ 𝐸), 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑁
Information 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 might be “Sensitive” 𝐼 𝑆 in relation with a particular entity 𝑒𝑗 and nonsensitive to others. When the information remains within the exposure boundary it is
considered non-sensitive; however, once information flows outside the boundary it is
considered sensitive. For example, salary information is not sensitive within members of a
family, but it may be sensitive for those outside the family. The exposure boundary is
designated by the information owner entity 𝑒𝑖 . Therefore, sensitive information is a relative
classification between the entity that possess the information and the others who exist in
the environment.
𝐼 𝑆 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ) = (𝑒𝑗 ∉ 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 )
As previously noted, based on an entity’s interaction, information can be classified as
sensitive or non-sensitive in relation with the entity interacting with. Also, information can
also be classified as implicit in relation to operations that can be applied on the explicit
information. Implicit information can be transformed to explicit information by the
execution of an operation. This means that an operation can be modeled as a function that
extracts implicit information from explicit information. An operation can also combine the
explicit information with other shared information (denoted as 𝐼 𝑠ℎ ) to transform the
implicit 𝐼 𝑖𝑚 information to explicit 𝐼 𝑒𝑥 . The shared information 𝐼 𝑠ℎ is collected or inferred
information, which it does not reflect the privacy of any information on its own. 𝐼 𝑠ℎ can
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expose information about an entity if used in combination with other 𝐼 𝑒𝑥 information.
Therefore, any implicit information is equivalent to some explicit information that can be
defined as follows:
𝑜(𝐼 𝑒𝑥 , 𝐼 𝑠ℎ ) = 𝐼 𝑖𝑚
Manipulation of explicit information by applying operations can transform implicit
information into explicit form.
𝑜̿ (𝐼 𝑒𝑥 , 𝐼 𝑠ℎ , 𝐼 𝑖𝑚 )
Illustrates that Executing Operation (o) on explicit information 𝐼 𝑒𝑥 transforms the implicit
information to an explicit form of 𝐼 𝑖𝑚 . In contrast,
̃
𝑜̿ (𝐼 𝑖𝑚
, 𝐼 𝑒𝑥 )
is used to show the execution of an operation that is prevented or neutralized. And in this
case, the application of the operation cannot proceed.
The flow of the information 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 that belong to the entity 𝑒𝑖 with a particular participant
entity 𝑒𝑗 , is not considered to be sensitive ¬𝐼 𝑠 . As such, “sharing” is defined as a process
that takes place only within the exposure boundary and can be formally expressed as:
𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ) = ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
Through “sharing” non-sensitive explicit information, it is possible to disclose implicit
information by introducing an operation 𝑜𝑗,𝑤 on the shared information 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 . This might
result transforming non-sensitive information ¬𝐼 𝑠 to sensitive information 𝐼 𝑠 . The implicit
information can be labeled as sensitive or non-sensitive. This suggests that the disclosure
of information can result in transferring information outside of its exposure boundary.
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For instance, Ali’s mark in a specific subject is classified as sensitive information. For
example, Ali shares with Amy information, which states that his mark is 10% percent more
than the average mark of his colleagues. If Amy has an operation that is capable of
retrieving the overall students’ average mark, she will be able to extract Ali’s mark. In this
example, the statement “Ali’s mark is 10% percent above the average of all the student
marks is explicit information, while Amy’s operations and this information implicitly refer
to Ali’s mark which is considered being sensitive. This illustrates how implicit information
may convey sensitive information and by transform it into explicit information will reveal
the implicit sensitive information.
𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ) = 𝑜𝑗 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 )
Although entities have the authority to protect their relevant explicit sensitive information
by not sharing it outside the boundary, there are concerns when the implicit information is
transformed into explicit sensitive information.
Given the earlier example, 𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 is representing the statement “Ali’s mark is 10% percent
less than the average mark of his classmates”. Amy also belongs to the exposure boundary
𝐸𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 where implies ¬𝐼 𝑆 (𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ′ , 𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑦 ). If Amy has a retrieval operation (𝑜𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑡 ) on a
statistical dataset that includes the students average marks 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 and calculates Ali’s mark,
𝑜𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑡 (𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ′ , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 ) is the implicit information that reflects Ali’s mark (𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ′ ).
𝑜̿𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑡 (𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 , 𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 , 𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ′ )
This suggests that if Amy executes 𝑜̿𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑟𝑒𝑡 (𝐼 𝑎𝑢𝑥 , 𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ′ ), she can extract Ali’s mark.
Disseminating information ultimately can be modeled by operations where the
functionality of the operation is to transfer the information to other entities. As an example,
Amy may perform an operation to send 𝐼𝐴𝑙𝑖,𝑘 to Shawn.
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One of the main challenges of privacy relates to the execution of operations that convert
sensitive implicit information to explicit form. As such, having knowledge about the
operations of the entity that receives the information can indicate what sensitive
information can be retrieved. This introduces the concept of authorized operations. 𝑂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 is
a set of operations belonging to 𝑂𝑗 where 𝑒𝑖 has agreed to their application on 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 . In this
case, the privacy concern is related to applying operations that transform explicit
information to the sensitive form of this information. This leads to privacy concerns about
sensitive information as a result of transferring information outside the boundary through
non-authorized operations.
Modeling privacy as a computational concept requires identifying measures that can reflect
privacy in a computational model. The concepts that explain the state of privacy among
interacting entities are applied in managing measures that can be associated to
computational concepts.
When entities share information, they agree on the terms of utilization of the shared
information. These terms can be enforced through the norms of various cultures in people
societies [22] or electronic legal agreements among web services [78] Ideally, these
agreements include a permitted set of operations that can be applied on the shared
information. Not disobeying the established agreement through the execution of nonauthorized operations 𝑂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 is considered evidence of a privacy violation. For instance, in
the above example, if 𝑒𝑗 executes a non-authorized operation 𝑜, then it is said that 𝑒𝑗 has
violated the privacy of 𝑒𝑖 . Accordingly:
−(𝑂̂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑂𝑖 , 𝑂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 )
Where:
𝑖,𝑘
𝑖,𝑘
𝑖,𝑘
𝑂̂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 = {𝑂̂𝑗,1
, … , 𝑂̂𝑗,𝑡
, … , 𝑂̂𝑗,𝑇
}, 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇
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The non-authorized operations can also be defined in relation to all of information about
an entity.
𝑀

𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 = ⋃(∅, 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 ) 1 < 𝑘 < 𝑀
𝑘=1

Based on the scope of communicated information through sharing and disclosure, nonauthorized operations can also be applied 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 on a subset of information (𝑆).
𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 (𝑆) =

⋃

(∅, 𝑂̂𝑗𝑠 )

∀𝑠(𝑠∈𝑃𝑆(𝑆))

A computation system (𝐶) including entities (𝑒) provides a solution (𝑆) to a problem 𝑃
by applying computation processes 𝐶𝑝 [71].
𝐶: 𝑒 × 𝑃 × 𝐶𝑃 → 𝑆
DEFINITION 1: (𝑆) is an acceptable solution (𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑠)) as it resolves the problem
and does not result in privacy concerns [71].
DEFINITION 2: Privacy Model in the context of sensitive information (𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙) [71]
is:
𝑘≤𝑀

𝑃: {𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 } × 𝐼𝑖 × 𝑂𝑗 → ⋃ ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
𝑘=1

Privacy Concerns Management
Due to the fact that computation in CDS takes place at an interaction level where entities
exchange information, then modeling the privacy protection in the context of the
information management is reasonable for CDS in open environment. Moreover, the
message-based interactions in CDS can be modeled with information management into
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information collection, processing and dissemination. Modeling privacy in this manner
enables application of the privacy protection model in interactions. Through which, privacy
protection becomes part of the computation. The interactions are steered by interaction
protocols that are abstracted as a set of messages and sequences. By incorporating the
privacy model at the interaction level, it creates a privacy protection management
framework. This expands interaction protocol messages and sequences that are supported
by privacy protection mechanisms.
The concern of non-authorized characteristics of an operation that relates to the interacting
entity. Entities agree on set of operations that cannot be executed over the shared
information. This is considered to be the agreement θ𝑖,𝑘
𝑖,𝑗 between entities 𝑒𝑗 and 𝑒𝑖 by
𝑖,𝑘
executing non-authorized operations 𝑂̂𝑗,𝑤
on 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 :
𝑖,𝑘
𝑖,𝑘
𝑃𝑉(𝑒𝑗 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖,𝑘 , θ𝑖,𝑘
̂̿𝑖,𝑤
(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 )]
𝑖,𝑗 ) = ∃ 𝑤|θ𝑖,𝑗 ∧ [𝑜

While the privacy violation (𝑃𝑉) is about disobeying the agreement among entities, while
privacy protection is about enforcing mechanisms that prevent application of nonauthorized operations on entities’ information. Hence, the privacy protection (𝑃𝑃) is about
preventing execution of non-authorized operations on all subsets of information.
̿ 𝑡̃
(𝑡)
𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑗 , (𝑃𝑆(𝐼𝑖 )), 𝑂̂𝑗 ) = ∀𝑡, 𝑤|(𝑡 ⊂ 𝑃𝑆(𝐼𝑖 )) ∧ 𝑜̂𝑗,𝑤
Preventing the processing of 𝐼𝑖 using the operation o is considered privacy protection.
Operations in this type of protection mechanisms requires an awareness of what operation
will be applied on information. If non-authorized there will be no result or if authorized,
the result will be provided.
The punishing approach in privacy protection mechanism is applied in situations where
preventing sharing information is not possible. However, some operations provide
assurances to owners of information. If a collecting entity violates privacy requirements,
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the owner of the information may execute punishing operations. An example of this
approach is terms and conditions that are accepted by both entities. If any operation outside
of the agreement occurs, there are legal consequences for the non-compliant entity.
When preventive mechanisms cannot be applied, the punishing mechanism is an option.
For instance, when a service provider interacts with a consumer in a different time period,
the information that is aggregated in this period can be used to transform sensitive implicit
information to explicit using auxiliary information. In this case, punishing mechanism are
more effective. Such punishing mechanisms support agreements between two entities
which enforce the execution of consecutive action towards the faulty entity.
Protection mechanisms can be applied at information and operation levels. Typically,
protection mechanisms at the information level limit the access of entities to the
information that is shared. As an example, sensitive information accessed through adequate
resolving of a requested task is nonetheless not disclosed. Still, this may be inadequate in
relation to applications that require receiving the non-distorted complete information. To
address this, protection mechanisms at the operation level are more advantageous.

Privacy Protection in CDS
The analysis within this research indicates that among existing privacy models, attending
to settings can be inadequate for CDS environments. The privacy model in CDS has to be
captured at computation and therefore requires a formal modeling of privacy. The proposed
formal privacy model is in the context of information management where entities are
modeled as a set of information and operations. Information management is categorized as
information collection, processing and dissemination [71].
CDS is a class of systems that is positioned as a computation platform in which
computation occurs based on the interactions of entities. Solutions in CDS are achieved by
participation of entities in a distributed decentralized fashion. This requires resolving the
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interdependency problem through coordinating activities that adopt interaction
mechanisms.
In the incomplete knowledge environment, entities update their knowledge about the
environment and solve their problems through message-based interactions.
THEOREM 1: Any incomplete knowledge CDS computation is an(𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔) [71].
The computation 𝐶 in incomplete knowledge CDS toward a solution 𝑆 happens in
interactions 𝐼𝑛 among entities 𝐸 therefore:
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼𝑛 → 𝑆
Due to the assumption that entities have incomplete knowledge in CDS, knowledge in
modeled as information; and interaction is modeled as information collection, processing
and dissemination which can be abstracted as operation and information. Hence:
𝐼𝑛 =< 𝐼, 𝑂 >
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼𝑛 → 𝑆
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼, 𝑂 → 𝑆
Giving DEFINITION 1and DEFINITION 2 and based on THEOREM 1 computation in
incomplete knowledge CDS can be modeled as information management computation.
THEOREM 2: Let (𝑃) be a (𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙). For any (𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔), (𝑃) is essential to have
(𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) [71].
𝑘≤𝑀

(𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙): {𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 } × 𝐼𝑖 × 𝑂𝑗 → ⋃ ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
𝑘=1

𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝐼 × 𝑂
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𝑘≤𝑀

∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 | 𝑄 = ⋃ ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
𝑘=1

𝑖𝑓 ∃ 𝑠, ∈ (𝑠, 𝑆)| ∉ (𝑠, 𝑄) → ¬(𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑠))
This affirm that the acceptable solution must include the (𝑃 − 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙).
Therefore, computation in incomplete knowledge CDS can be modeled as information
management computation, which based on THEOREM 2 affirms the proposed privacy
model is applicable and required to achieve acceptable solutions.

3.4.1 Privacy Protection Mechanism
Managing privacy protection requires a protection mechanism, where the privacy
protection mechanisms require knowing the operations of entities and being aware of what
operations are authorized. In various instances in CDS environments, the assumption is
that the knowledge of entities is incomplete which implies uncertainty about the entities
and their operations. Capturing this uncertainty provides levels of knowledge about the
operations which affirms the exercise of quasi-protection mechanisms in varied CDS
environments.
Quasi-protection mechanisms convey levels of uncertainty about the extent of nonauthorized operations that the mechanism can prevent from execution. For instance,
anonymization techniques can provide privacy protection with a degree of probability [20],
[27][23]. Others, such as rule-based mechanisms for protecting privacy, are capable of
supporting a limited number of non-authorized operations [18][69]. The uncertainty level
in these cases is captured as Privacy Protection Level (PPL). PPL is a probabilistic base
model to describe the effectiveness of a mechanism to prevent or neutralize non-authorized
operations from producing sensitive information. This measure can be associated to
computational concepts. The execution of the mechanism 𝜇 in relation to protecting
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privacy (𝑃𝑃) is the space 𝑆, in a way protection mechanism can prevent the execution of a
non-authorized operation:
𝜇̿ = 𝑃𝑃 (𝑒𝑗 , 𝑆, 𝑂̂𝑗𝑖 (𝑆))
By applying the mechanism over the space of entities’ information set, there is a level of
uncertainty associated with the application of the protection mechanism which implies the
conditional probability protecting privacy by executing 𝜇 given the space of 𝐼𝑖 . In another
word, the probability of 𝜇 protecting privacy is measured when it is applied on 𝐼𝑖 .
𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑗 , 𝐼𝑖 , 𝜇) = 𝑃(𝜇̿ |𝐼𝑖 )
This can be measured either statistically or characteristically. For instance, in a simplified
view, in a complete knowledge world where entities have the knowledge over all
communicated information, in a discrete set of operations and an algebraic form, evaluating
PPL depends on non-authorized operations that are prevented from application by applying
𝑧

the mechanism (𝑧) to all non-authorized operations (𝑛); 𝑃𝑃𝐿 = 𝑛 .
PPL is a measure that predicts privacy protection in an interaction among two entities.
Depending on the context and architecture of the environment, PPL might be evaluated
differently using the same approach. As an example, in this section, PPL is evaluated based
on differential privacy [27][20]. A randomized function (𝐾) is ∈ −𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦
if for all databases (𝐷1 ) and (𝐷2 ) differing on at most one element and all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔 (𝐾).
Pr[𝐾(𝐷1 ) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ exp(∈) × Pr[𝐾(𝐷2 ) ∈ 𝑆]
To achieve differential privacy, a mechanism is required that can implement differential
privacy [71], [68]. The probability of a mechanism implementing differential privacy is
1 − 2 ∈.
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Considering (𝑛) as number of non-authorized operations [queries] in info collector,
implementing ∈ −𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦 in (𝑧) number of non-authorized operations has
(1 − 2 ∈) probability in each of them. Therefore, it creates a binomial distribution in which
the expected value of (𝑧): 𝐸(𝑧) = 𝑛(1 − 2 ∈). This leads to 𝑃𝑃𝐿 = 1 − 2 ∈.
Differential privacy is a model for creating randomized function that has been applied in
various statistical databases including anonymized datasets. Where it collects and share
aggregate information about user habits, while maintaining the privacy of individual users
participants share some information with an info collector which is sensitive to share with
another entity.
𝑆(𝐼𝑘,1 , 𝑒𝑖 ) → ¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑘,1 , 𝑒𝑖 )
¬𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑘,1 , 𝑒𝑖 ) → 𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑘,1 , 𝑒𝑖 )
There is some auxiliary information about participants that is possessed by the adversary.
It can be explicitly received or implicitly inferred.
𝐷(𝐼𝑘,p , 𝑒𝑗 ) → (𝐼𝑘,p ∈ 𝐼𝑖 )
The info collector applies a mechanism [differential privacy] to prevent the execution of
(𝑜𝑗,𝑛 ). Differential privacy mechanism enables the info collector to include noise
information to the result of each query. The outcome is new information that cannot be
used for retrieving (𝐼𝑘,1 ).
̿ 𝑘,𝑝 ({𝐼𝑘,𝑝 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑏′ })! = 𝐼𝑘,1
𝑃𝑃: 𝑜𝑖,𝑚′ | 𝑜̿𝑖,𝑚 , ({𝐼𝑘,1 , 𝐷, 𝐷𝐵, 𝐼𝑖,𝑏 }) = 𝐼𝑖,𝑏′ ∧ 𝑜̂𝑗,𝑛
Utilizing the differentially private randomizing functions is motivated by modeling privacy
protection at the participation of entities. In the other word, privacy protection is the state
of producing outputs [explicit information] in which participation of any single entity does
not impact the result to a large extend. This argues that “participation of an entity in a
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statistical database” is the information that privacy protection is targeting. This suggests
that “participation” is considered to be sensitive information.
Sensitivity is in direct relation with the perception of an entity about the recipients of
information [45]. However, the above analysis illustrates that there is an assumption in
differential privacy which only considers the “ownership” of information as sensitive
information. This is the reason that sensitivity is captured at the operation level. The result
of all operations will be incorporated with the levels of noise which can satisfy the
conditions of differentially private functions.
Privacy protection mechanisms are operations that are applied on information and provide
the necessary information for privacy protection. This indicates the structure of privacy
protection mechanism is the set of operations it applies (𝑂𝜇 ) and the set of information
generated by the operations (𝐼𝜇 ).
𝜇 = (𝑂𝜇 , 𝐼𝜇 )
Privacy protection mechanism can also be categorized as preventive and punishing. When
mechanism operations are applied before sharing information, it is preventive and when it
is practiced after non-authorized operations are executed, it becomes a punishing
mechanism.
DEFINITION 3: A computation system including entities (𝐸) that provides a solution (𝑆)
to a problem (𝑃) by applying computation processes (𝐶𝑃) [71].
𝐶: 𝐸 × 𝑃 × 𝐶𝑃 → 𝑆
DEFINITION 4: (𝐶) is Information Management computation system (𝑖 − 𝑚𝑛𝑔) when
problem and solution are modeled as information and computation as operation [71].
Operations in information management can be classified as collection, processing and
dissemination that can be executed by entities (𝐸).
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As it has mentioned in DEFINITION 1: (𝑆) is an acceptable solution (𝑠 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑠)) as
it resolves the problem and does not result in privacy concern.
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4

Privacy Protection Management Framework

The assumption is that requester entities have various expectations and preferences with
respect to privacy from potential provider entities, and that these expectations and
preferences change in different contexts and at different times. In the proposed model, the
risk of interaction of entities is a measure to determine proceeding interactions. If the risk
of interaction is not acceptable to the requester entity, it will refuse and search for
alternatives. Otherwise, entities take the risk and share the required information [58]. Under
this assumption, the proposed framework can evaluate the risk of interaction and possible
privacy protections to enable entities to make decisions that can protect their privacy and
resolve the interdependency problem.

Privacy Protection at the Interaction Level
As noted in Chapter 3, CDS privacy protection can be reduced to operations and
information which enable it to be part of information management. In which, in the context
of information management, information can be categorized as information collection,
information processing and information dissemination. Information management is
deployed at the interaction level where the computation takes place and information is
collected, disseminated or processed. Providing privacy protection at the interaction level
is an architectural approach that can benefit various applications. In a way, the participant
entities are utilizing interaction protocols to resolve their interdependency problem.
The initial point where the entities start sharing their information is during the interaction
among the participant entities. The focus of this research is on message-based interactions.
Providing the privacy protection mechanism at the interaction protocol enables
applications to delegate the privacy resolution procedure to the interaction protocol, and
the solution space of those applications will be limited to entities that can protect entities’
privacy.
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4.1.1 Privacy-Based Interaction Protocol
The interaction is modeled based on the type of the interdependency issue that the protocol
is designed for, which is solved through the interaction.
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = < 𝛿, 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝐼𝑃 >
𝛿 is the type of interdependency [32], and 𝑒𝑖 is the entity that requires the capabilities of
other entities, such as 𝑒𝑗 , to solve its’ capability interdependence issue. Interaction protocol
𝐼𝑃, is acquired by the participant entities to coordinate their activities. Message-based 𝐼𝑃
is modeled as a set of messages 𝑀 and the pattern of sequences 𝑆(𝑀) that includes
messages that are exchanged among entities. Sequences in the 𝐼𝑃 refer to the pattern of the
exchanged messages. The given sequence indicates where information is collected and
disseminated. As described in the proposed privacy model, collecting and disseminating
information can be reduced at the operation level. Similarly, the existing sequences of an
IP also can be modeled by the sequence of operations 𝑜𝐼𝑃 . Therefore, the structure of 𝐼𝑃
can be reduced to operations and be modeled as:
𝐼𝑃 = [𝑜𝐼𝑃,1 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑞 , … , 𝑜𝐼𝑃,𝑄 ]
To protect privacy at the interaction level, privacy protection mechanisms should be
incorporated into the operations of the interaction protocol. As discussed, privacy
protection mechanisms have a set of operations 𝑜 𝑚 that are executed in a specific order:
𝑂𝜇 = [𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 ]
The assumption is that the privacy protection mechanism involves entities that match with
the architecture of the interaction protocol. The privacy protection management framework
requires transforming the interaction protocol to a protocol that is integrated with privacy
protection mechanisms and delivers the solution for which it is designed. One of the
objectives of the proposed framework is to provide a solution space that meets privacy
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requirements. To achieve this, the framework merges the operations of the privacy
protection mechanism with the interaction protocol operations, in an ordered fashion.
By capturing the exposure boundary, it is possible to identify the sensitive information. If
information is sensitive, a protection mechanism that can prevent the execution of nonauthorized operations is enabled. Therefore, any operation in the interaction protocol that
discloses sensitive information will be substituted with sequences of operations that include
the protection mechanism.
Given the operations in an interaction protocol and protection mechanism operations, every
operation in the protection mechanism has been targeted for protecting sensitive
information. Therefore, any operations in the interaction protocol that discloses the
sensitive information will be substituted with the sequence of the interaction operation
protraction. Therefore, merging the operations of the privacy protection mechanism with
the operations of interaction protocol requires extending the message types and sequences
of the protocol. The extension introduces the interaction protocol as a privacy protectionbased interaction protocol that integrates the privacy protection mechanism at the
interaction level.
Shared information within a set of entities must remain within the given exposure boundary
of information in relation to the participant entities. Based on the information that is shared
through the interaction protocol within the exposure boundary about a specific entity 𝑒𝑖 ,
there is a protection mechanism that can prevent execution on non-authorized operations.
The proposed framework using the provided information at the risk evaluation, PPL
evaluation and the interaction protocol reduces the number of possible solutions to only
those entities that can provide the expected solution-based privacy protection. By applying
the risk evaluation model, it is possible to identify the sensitive information that might be
shared among entities in the environment while the messages and sequences of messages
among entities construct the interaction protocol of that environment. The framework has
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the exposure boundary, interaction protocol, PPL evaluation and the type of privacy
protection mechanisms that can provide messages and sequences that represent the privacybased interaction protocol. Entities that adhere to this interaction protocol seamlessly
interact with other entities and the interaction protocol applies the privacy protection
operations to protect privacy independent from the application. This allows the privacy
protection in CDS to be incorporated at the architectural level and to be part of the
computation platform.
The operations in the privacy protection mechanism may require a new type of message in
the message set of the protocol in addition to an extension on the sequence of the interaction
protocol. Through accommodating the privacy protection mechanism at the interaction
protocol level, the interaction is limited to entities whose privacy can be protected with an
acceptable PPL in their interaction. The sequence of the operations in the interaction
protocol is not changed in the privacy-based interaction protocol but the operations of the
privacy protection mechanisms are applied. This can prevent or neutralize the execution of
non-authorized operations and transforming sensitive implicit information to explicit. Each
of the applied mechanisms has a PPL value, and several mechanisms can be integrated with
an interaction protocol to form a privacy-based interaction protocol.

Privacy Protection at the Interaction Level
The proposed framework provides the protection mechanisms at the interaction level and
extends the interaction protocol with essential messages and sequences to protect the
sensitive information that is shared or disclosed in the original interaction protocol.
Theorem 1: For any incomplete knowledge CDS where entities adopt message-based
interaction, the Privacy Model can be adequately addressed at the interaction level [71].
To provide the supporting materials for the above theorem, it is essential to prove the
following points:
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•

All the information that is shared or disclosed to other entities is decided at the
interaction level

•

Any class of privacy protection mechanism occurs at the interaction level.

The computation entity in CDS has autonomy on coordinating activities with others. The
interaction layer manages the necessary processes to identify the adequate messages to
communicate and resolve the interdependency problem. The communication layer is
responsible for exchanging messages; however, it does not have the decision-making
authority on the messages to be sent and it is not aware of the intent that initiates the
exchange of messages.
Proof:
Lemma 1: Let 𝑒𝑖 ≡< 𝐾𝑖 , 𝑃𝑆𝑖 , 𝐼𝑛𝑖 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 > the computation entity. For any information 𝐼𝑖,𝑟
that is going to be shared with 𝑒𝑗 . 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) is decided in (𝐼𝑛𝑖 ) [71].
If 𝑃𝑆𝑖 realizes that to achieve a goal, there is an interdependency problem, 𝐼𝑛𝑖 finds a
coordination solution 𝐶𝑆𝑖 with an entity such as 𝑒𝑗 .
If (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ) is shared with (𝑒𝑗 )
∃𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ∈ 𝐼𝑖𝐾 )|𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
There are two possibilities:
1. It is discovered at 𝑃𝑆𝑖 that 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 is required to perform the 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑗 therefore:
𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑗 → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
2. It is discovered at 𝐼𝑛𝑖 that 𝐼𝑖,𝑟 has to be shared with (𝑒𝑗 )
𝐼𝑛𝑖 → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
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In both cases, the shared information is processed and determined by the interaction layer.
Lemma 2: Let (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ) be the information that is disclosed. For any (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ) there is explicit
information that is shared [71].
∃𝐼𝑖,𝑟 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ∈ 𝐼𝑖𝐾 )| 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 )
When information is implicitly disclosed:
𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) → ∃ 𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ , 𝑜𝑗,𝑤 | 𝑜𝑗,𝑤 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ , 𝐼 𝑠ℎ𝑟 )
Assuming 𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ is not shared through the interaction. Then there are two possibilities:
1. Fact A: 𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ is auxiliary shared information 𝐼 𝑠ℎ𝑟 disseminated by a third party (𝑒𝑡 )
then:
Using lemma 1:
1. If (𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ ) is shared with any entity, therefore:
a. Either 𝐷(𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑡 ) so that Fact A occurs
b. Or it has not been shared by an interaction. This contradicts Lemma 1.
This proves that any information that is shared or disclosed has initiated sharing point at
the interaction.
In privacy protection, the privacy model is defined as:
̿𝑡
𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑗 , (𝑃𝑆(𝐼𝑖 ), 𝑂̂𝑗 ) = ∀ 𝑡, 𝑤|𝑡 ⊂ 𝑃𝑆(𝐼𝑖 )) ∧ 𝑜̂̃
𝑗,𝑤 (𝑡)
̿𝑡
To achieve (𝑜̂̃
𝑗,𝑤 (𝑡) ), the privacy protection mechanisms are applied. The privacy
protection mechanisms can be classified at the information or operation levels.
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Lemma 3: If a preventive protection mechanism at the information level exists, it happens
at the interaction [71].
Let (𝜇) be a preventive mechanism (𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷 ) at the information level for protecting
̿𝑡
𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) which enables (𝑜̂̃
𝑗,𝑤 (𝑡) ).
̿𝑡
𝜇̿ → 𝑃𝑃 (𝑒𝑗 , {𝐼𝑖,𝑟 }, (𝑜̂̃
𝑗,𝑤 (𝑡) ))
𝜇 = < 𝑂𝜇 , 𝐼 𝜇 >
𝑂𝜇 = { 𝑜𝑚,1 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝑑 , … , 𝑜𝑚,𝐷 }
The execution of preventive protection mechanisms at information level sequence order
during the interaction. This results in sharing information that is manipulated by the
operations in protection mechanisms.
𝜇̿ → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ , 𝑒𝑗 )
Based on Lemma 1, (𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ ) has to go through interactions. Therefore, the preventive
mechanisms at the information level can happen at the interaction level.
Lemma 4: If a preventive mechanism exists, it happens at the interaction level [71].
𝑡
Let (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 ) be the sensitive information that can implicitly be disclosed to (𝑒𝑗 ) through (𝑜̂𝑗,𝑤
)

when (𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ ) is shared.
Let (𝜇) be the protection mechanism at the operation level that can protect (𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ ). Based
on the execution of the protection mechanisms at the operation:
∅ 𝑖𝑓 ∈ (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̂𝑗𝑡 )
𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷 ({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−1 ({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̿ 𝑚,𝐷−2 ({𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , … , 𝑜̿ 𝑚,1 (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝐼𝑗,𝑟 )})})}) = {
𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ 𝑖𝑓 ∈ (𝑜𝑗,𝑤 , 𝑜̂𝑗𝑡 )
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Which results in sharing (𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ ) or (∅). Therefore, based on Lemma 1, privacy protection
happens at the interaction level.
Lemma 5: if there are punishing privacy protection mechanisms, it happens at the
interaction level.
The generated information in this mechanism is shared with the entity that has executed
the non-authorized operations.
𝜇̿ → 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑟′ , 𝑒𝑗 )
This indicates that the punishing mechanisms happen at the interaction level.
Given Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, it is proven that any protection mechanisms will be applied
at the interaction level. Therefore, capturing the privacy protection at the interaction level
can be sufficient.
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5

Privacy Protection Model and Practical Implementation

Introducing the privacy protection model and privacy protection management framework
as a computational generic approach that can ensure privacy protection at the interaction
level through the interaction protocol. In some respects, the privacy protection model and
framework can be utilized as an analytical tool to identify concerns in an interaction
protocol and can be incorporated with protection mechanisms [71]. In such an
implementation, privacy protection management can be automated in the computation
entity or at the computation platform. Any achieved solution at the interaction level
requires problem solving and coordination with other participant entities. Thus far, we have
proved that to reach acceptable solutions, privacy resolution is essential as computation
element at the interaction level.
Our contribution in this work includes designing and developing a privacy-aware
computation entity and a privacy protection platform base. In each, the focus is on the
computation aspect of the framework that can be practically introduced, thereby
introducing the framework elements in the context of practical privacy protection, such as
the information categorization, privacy protection mechanisms and exposure boundary of
information. The practicality of the privacy protection management framework can affect
the implementation of the privacy protection base interaction protocol.

Privacy Protection Concept at the Interaction Level
The main focus is at the interaction level where the computation takes place in addition to
the information exchange among entities. As such, the information management becomes
an adequate means of molding privacy protection for CDS. Privacy protection is considered
during the computation as part of the entity at the interaction level, in which, the
interactions are the mechanisms of coordination used to resolve the interdependency
problem. Therefore, computation entities can adequately be modeled as (CIR-agents)
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whereby they have knowledge, problem solving capabilities, interaction, and
communication [32][56][71]. The following figure shows the logical architecture of a
computation entity.
Modeling the computation entity (CIR-agent) Figure 2: Computation Entity in CDS
composed is of Knowledge(𝐾𝑖 ), Problem solver(𝑃𝑆𝑖 ), Interaction (𝐼𝑛𝑖 ) and
Communication(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 ). In this information management form of computation, entities
are modeled as information and operation.
𝑒𝑖 ≡< 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑂𝑖 >
Knowledge (𝐾𝑖 ): conveys all information regarding intentions, belief and states of the
entity. This includes information regarding operations that the entity possesses and is
capable of applying.
Problem Solver (𝑃𝑆𝑖 ): an adjoined layer of the knowledge. It consists of operations to
identify goals and required actions towards these achieving this through the information
acquired from the knowledge. Because of this, problem solving can be modeled as an
operation in information management.
Interaction (𝐼𝑛𝑖 ): is adjacent to the knowledge, problem solver and communication layers.
Through this, the interaction can be modeled as information and operations. The
computation entity at the interaction level utilizes a pattern of communication and decisionmaking to resolve the interdependency problem.
Communication (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑖 ): encompasses the messages that will be communicated to other
entities, but it does not interfere with coordinating the decision-making processes. The
communication layer is modeled as information in information management.
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Privacy protection solution as a computation concept are inherently expressed at the
interaction level to facilitate a protection-based interaction among participant entities.
Applying the proposed privacy protection management framework will incorporate the
privacy protection management directly at the interaction level as illustrated in Figure 3,
to consolidate interactions with privacy protection management and privacy-based
interaction protocol.

Figure 3: Privacy Protection at the Interaction
Level
The interaction protocol consists of a set of messages and each message has a content 𝐶𝑚 ;
this content 𝐶𝑚 involves sender 𝑒𝑠 and receiver 𝑒𝑟 entities and operations 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 that transfer
the message.
𝑀 = {𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑚 }, 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑍
𝑚𝑚 =< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 >,
(𝐶𝑚 ∈ 𝐼𝑖 ), ∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 ∈ 𝑂𝑠 )
As was mentioned earlier, the interaction protocols can be modeled as sets of messages 𝑀
and sequences 𝑆𝑀 thereof:
𝐼𝑃 < 𝑀, 𝑆𝑀 >
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Where sequences are constructed by patterns of exchanging messages
𝑍

𝑀∗ = ⋃ 𝑀𝑘 ,
𝑘=1

𝑀∗ : 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑀.
𝑀𝑘 : 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔ℎ𝑡.
Therefore,
𝑆𝑀 = [𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑞 ]
𝑆𝑀 < 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 >
𝑆𝑀 ⊂ 𝑀∗
Messages are bound to operations that deliver them. 𝑆𝑞𝑜 represents the sequence of
operations:
𝑆𝑞𝑜 = [𝑜𝑖,𝑎 , … , 𝑜𝑖,𝑁 ], 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑁

Privacy Protection Management Framework in CDS
Privacy protection is a critical aspect in decentralized environments. Entities share
information through communication-based interactions. Privacy protection as a
computation concept is inherently expressed at the interaction level. Appling the privacy
solutions at the computation level, will facilitate interaction among the participant entities
in a way that maintains a privacy aware driven interaction.
Interactions in CDS are steered by interaction protocols that can be modeled as messages
and sequences of messages. Privacy protection management is responsible for identifying
the privacy concerns in interaction protocols and providing a privacy-based interaction
protocol that encompasses the protection operations to protect privacy. Incorporating the
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proposed privacy protection framework as a computational aspect at the interaction level
will enable entities to categorize their information in relation with other participant entities
and set their exposure boundaries for their information armed with a privacy protection
mechanism.

5.2.1Information Sensitivity Categorization
Applying the privacy protection framework principles to information 𝐼𝑖 will enable the
assessment and categorization of that information as either sensitive 𝐼𝑖𝑠 , or non-sensitive
¬𝐼𝑖𝑠 in relation with the other exiting entities in the environment. For whether information
is recognized as sensitive or not is determined by the information owner, which is
subjective aspect between the information and the participant entities 𝑅∗ . Sensitive
information can be captured as the following:
𝐼𝑖𝑠 = ⋃

𝑘≤𝑁,𝑗≤𝑊
𝑘=1,𝑗=1

(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )| ( 𝑒𝑗 ∈ (𝑅∗ − 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 ))

Naturally information exists in explicit form, and it can be classified as implicit information
when in conjunction with operations. Operations can retrieve the implicit form of
information by processing the shared information and turning it into the explicit, and so
the classification of information – sensitive or non-sensitive – according to the information
utility. Information can be tagged as sensitive information in relation to other entities that
could implicitly retrieve new forms of information However, the same information can be
tagged as non-sensitive in relation with another group of entities. This demonstrates that
not all of the extracted information has a high risk of privacy concerns, as in many case the
retrieved information can be non-sensitive. However, in this case, there are no privacy
concerns.
Our assumption is that the “information sensitivity” is a subjective aspect in relation with
a specific entity. Each piece information is measured differentially with each of the
participant entities in the environment 𝐸. Accordingly, the information 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 categorization
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is bounded to information utility, for which categorizing information will demonstrate the
state of the Exposure Boundary 𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) .
𝐼 𝑆 (𝐼𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑒𝑗 ) = (𝑒𝑗 ∉ 𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) )
𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) {𝑒𝑟 , … , 𝑒𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑁 }, 𝐸 (𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) ⊂ 𝐸), 1 ≤ 𝑟, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑁
Any piece of information (I), in order to be categorized it needs to be mapped separately
to each participant entity (𝑒𝐾 ) in the environment in terms of their operations. The
information sensitivity is measured from the Utility (U) model. Capturing the Utility (U)
of each piece information with each capable participant entity, then the Risk (R) of sharing
information can be identified based on the expected utility (𝐸𝑈). The risk of sharing
information is the chance that a negative impact exists, and so the negative impact is
modeled as the cost (𝐶) of sharing, and the chance is modeled as probability (𝑝) of the
cost potentially incurred
𝐶 = (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 )
𝑅 = 𝑃×𝐶
Capturing the information utility and the probability of occurrence, can give a threshold of
the expected utility (𝐸𝑈) and the probability
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐸𝑈) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑝) ∗ 𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑈)
Given the information related to the expected utility, the system can make a decision
despite the incomplete knowledge of the environment. However, this work does not
account for those instance in which the system is expected to operate given ignorance of
existing entities. the protection under ignorance. The determination of (𝐸𝑈) for each
information separately with each participant in a way the sensitivity of the information can
be assisted in relation with other participant entities.
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The decision-making process of sharing piece information takes place at the entity level.
Therefore, the entity can decide whether to accept the chance of a privacy concern by
measuring (EU) of the information to decide whether to procced with the interaction or
reject it and look for alternatives. This is in direct relation with (EU) and the accepted level
of PPL before establishing any interaction. Due to the given proposed information
management engine, the categorization process 𝑓𝑖 of the information 𝐼𝑟,𝑖 has demonstrated
against each of the participant entities 𝑒∀𝐾−𝑖 in relation to information and the entities,
expected operations.
𝑓𝑖 =< 𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝑒∀𝐾−𝑖 , 𝑢(𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 ) > ≡ 𝐼 𝑠
𝑒𝐾=𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ,

𝑒𝑗=𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑡

Signifying the Risk 𝑅 can produce the boundaries of the shared information. Finding the
𝐸𝑈 of each piece information with each participant entity can affects an entity’s decision.
We have categorized the 𝐸𝑈 of the information at three levels:
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘: 𝐸𝑈(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 ) < 0
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘: 𝐸𝑈(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 ) = 0
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡: 𝐸𝑈(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 ) > 0
Categorization of any piece of information can be demonstrated differently from one to
another entity, whether it is sensitive information or non-sensitive information, as in the
following:
-

Sensitive information:
𝐸𝑈 − (𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 ) = 𝐼 𝑠

-

Non-sensitive information:
𝐸𝑈 + (𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝑒𝑖 ) = ¬𝐼 𝑠
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Estimating the risk of sharing information 𝐼𝑖 with 𝑒𝑗 among all of the participant entities
𝑒𝐾 . Where the risk is the compound of the information utility 𝑈 of the information, and the
probability 𝑝 of the negative impact occurrence.
𝑓𝑖 < 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑒∀𝑗−𝐾 , 𝑅 > ≡ 𝐼 𝑠
𝑅 = (𝑝 ∗ 𝑢(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 )) ≤ 𝑢(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 ) , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑝 ≤ 1).

Replacing the Risk:
𝑓𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖 , 𝑒∀𝑗−𝐾 , (𝑝 ∗ 𝑢(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 )) ≤ 𝑢(𝐼𝑖,𝑗 ) ≡ 𝐼 𝑠
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑝 ≤ 1)
Since the risk of an interaction is a probabilistic view that associated with the occurrence
of negative impact event of privacy concerns on the entity. This allows decision-making
processes to evaluate the interaction and assess risk of information sharing that might affect
an entity’s privacy. As shown in Figure 4: Information Categorization.

Figure 4: Information Categorization
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As was earlier mentioned, information categorization is a relative aspect that can be
measured differently for each participant entity (𝑒𝑖 ) in relation with the information that is
to be released 𝐼𝑟,𝑖 . Since the open environment is imposing some limitation on the
participant entities, the proposed information categorization engine needs to be practical
assessed in a way that it can efficiently adopt the environment setting. Efficiency is
illustrated from the scope of time complexity of the information categorization engine
𝑓(𝐼𝑖 ).
In this section, the time complexity of the proposed information categorization engine 𝑓(𝐼𝑖 )
is captured for each 𝐼𝑖,𝑗 , powered by each participant entity 𝑒𝐾 . The information
categorization demonstrates that complexity is governed by the growth of the input (𝑛),
which is in this case the number of participant entities and evaluated information. Given
the previous analysis, the time complexity can be demonstrated as an exponential growth
𝑂(𝑛) that can be affected by the increments of the entities (𝑘) that need to be evaluated
against each information utility 𝑈 evolution (𝑚) in order to be categorized for (𝑛) rounds.
Thus, the growth of the worst-case complexity is correlated to the incremental size of the
input, which is the potential entities:
O(𝑛 ∗ 𝑚 ∗ 𝑘)
Each piece information needs to be mapped to the provider entity in the context of the
expected utility. From a practically perspective, the concept of information mapping is
considered practically attainable in the context of an open environment.

5.2.2 Exposure Boundary Identification
Privacy in the context of information management is the state of exposure boundary 𝐸𝑖,𝑘
of information 𝐼𝑖𝑘 . Exposure boundary 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 includes only entities that can share information
with each other. Each computational entity has all information, intentions, belief as well as
the exposure boundary of its’ information as part of its knowledge.
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(𝐼𝑖 ⊆ 𝐼𝑖𝑘 ), ∀𝑘(𝐸𝑖,𝑘 ⊂ 𝐼𝑖𝑘 )
Information is shared in an interaction protocol through messages 𝑚𝑚 by capturing the
sender 𝑒𝑠 receiver 𝑒𝑟 entities of the messages in the interaction protocol.
𝑚𝑚 =< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > ,
𝑂𝑠,𝑚 : 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 , 𝐶𝑚 : 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡, ∈ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ), ∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠 )
Therefore:
𝑒𝐾 = ⋃ {𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 }| < 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > ∈ 𝑀 , 𝑒𝐾 : 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
∀𝑠,𝑟

Introducing the privacy protection at interaction level as it is shown in Figure 3: Privacy
Protection at the Interaction Level, will adequately allow us to inject the privacy protection
management framework. Equipping a computational entity with the proposed privacy
protection management framework will enable sensitive information categorization and its
exposure boundary and the required privacy protection mechanism to maintain privacy
protection. By applying the privacy protection framework, the entity will be privacy awarebased as it presented in Figure 5 Privacy protection aware entity.

Figure 5: Privacy protection aware entity

63

Accordingly, this framework classifies the information into two forms, explicit and
implicit. The implicit form of information is a conjunction of explicit information and
operations. This shows that the privacy concern is mainly governed by information
transformation from one form to another by applying operations. Such operations become
non-authorized operations. Exposure boundary 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 is utilized by an entity to decide if other
entities that exist in the open environment are in its exposure boundary or not in relation
with their information.
𝐸𝑖,𝑘 = {𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑖,𝑁 } , ( 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 ⊂ 𝐸), 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑁
Participant entities do not have complete knowledge about the existence of others in the
environment. This lack of knowledge restricts entities in identifying 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 information in
relation with potential participant entities. Consequently, this imposes a practicality
shortage in identifying 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 in the open environment. However, the 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 is strongly coupled
with the categorization information.
In this analysis, the exposure boundary identification concept is measured from the
practicality implementation side, in which the exposure boundary classifies the potential
entities into two groups – “with-in” or “out-of” – the exposure boundary of the entity up
on the produced utility.
Giving 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 will index all participant entities that classify the participant entities given their
operations in relation with the released information. This demonstrates that the information
– sensitive or not – is a relative concept and not an absolute one. Entities will be mutually
exclusive in respect to their relation with the shared information 𝐼𝑟,𝑖 . The information
sensitivity in relation with others, implicitly introduce the concept of the 𝐸𝑖,𝑘
𝐸𝑖,𝑘 = {𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝑒𝑖,𝑁 } , ( 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 ⊂ 𝐸), 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑁
𝐼𝑟,𝑖 : 𝑒𝑖,𝑘 ∩ 𝑒𝑗,𝑘 = 𝜙
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𝑒𝑘 : 𝑒𝑖,𝑘 ∪ 𝑒𝑗,𝑘
The exposure boundary 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 concept needs to be practically identified in the context of the
open environment. Such an implementation is required to capture information utility that
can demonstrate the boundary of each piece information in relation with the participant
entities 𝑒𝐾 . The entity’s exposure boundary can be structured by in which time that the
outcome of the shared information utility introduces the categorization of the information
in relation with all of the participant entities 𝑈 + (𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝐾).
The exposure boundary of an entity will be constructed and demonstrated to consider
whether a set of entities is “IN” or “OUT” of the entity’s boundary
𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚: 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 {𝑘𝑖 |𝑈 + (𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖 }
(𝑗 ≠ 𝑖)
𝑶𝒖𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒚: 𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑘 {𝑘𝑗 |𝑈 −(𝐼𝑟,𝑖 , 𝑘𝑗 }
Any entity will be out of the entity 𝑒𝑖 exposure boundary 𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘), if information has been
categorized as sensitive ¬𝐼𝑖𝑠 in relation with a specific entity 𝑒𝑗 .
¬𝐼𝑖𝑠 = {𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) − 𝑒𝑗 }
The exposure boundary of an entity 𝐸𝑖,𝑘 is a subset of the all existing entities in the
environment 𝐸.
𝐸⃑𝑖,𝑘 = {𝐸 − 𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) } the index of 𝐼𝑟,𝑖
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Figure 6 shows information exposure boundary identification:
The exposure boundary efficiency is introduced in the time complexity aspect. Time

complexity is an approximation when an algorithm detects a termination point with respect
Figure 6 Information Exposure Boundary Identification
to a solution, where the complexity is an abstract model that can be applied to any
measurement. In this analysis, it has proportioned to time complexity 𝑂(𝑛 2 ) the boundary
complexity efficiency is measured based on the size of the space that an entity can be
exposed to and the complexity behind the number of the participant entities.
Correspondingly, the complexity source of the exposure boundary is correlated and driven
by the complexity of the information categorization, where the exposure boundary is
neutrally specified by the information categorization and that illustrations that the exposure
boundary identification complexity itself is:
𝑂 (𝐸(𝐼𝑖,𝑘) ) = 𝑂(𝑛)
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Figure 7. Information Categorization Management Engine illustrates the overall
information categorization engine:

Figure 7. Information Categorization Management Engine

5.2.3 Privacy- Based Interaction protocol
An interaction protocol (𝐼𝑃) is a structure that combines messages and their sequences.
Where the interaction protocol follows a sequence of messages (𝑀) and operations (𝑂)
among entities to deliver a content from one entity to another. 𝐼𝑃 has been modeled as sets
of messages (𝑀) and sequences (𝑆𝑀 ).
𝐼𝑃 =< 𝑀, 𝑆𝑀 >
Applying proposed privacy protection management frameworks as a computation aspect
and incorporating privacy protection management directly at the interaction level insures
that the privacy concerns that can be carried within the interaction protocols can captured
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𝐼𝑃 =< 𝑀, 𝑆𝑀 >
𝑀 ≡ {𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑚 }, 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑍
𝑚𝑚 ≡< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑟 , 𝐶𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠,𝑚 > ,
𝑒𝑟 : 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 , 𝑒𝑠 : 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝐶𝑚 : 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡, ∈ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ), ∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠 )
Released messages 𝑀𝑘 can contain an information that is carried over during the
interaction, where this message is passed through a specific set of sequences (𝑀∗ ), which
are constructed by patterns of exchanging messages
𝑍
∗

𝑀 = ⋃ 𝑀𝑘
𝑘=1

𝑀∗ : 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑀.
𝑀𝑘 : 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ.
Therefore,
𝑆𝑀 = [𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑞 ]
𝑆𝑀 < 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 >
𝑆𝑀 ⊂ 𝑀∗
The privacy concerns in the interaction protocol have been captured from message content
that might carry an information 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 that is considered sensitive to be exposed. This
information is exchanged through the messages 𝑀 and their sequences 𝑆𝑞,𝑡 . Therefore,
evaluating sequences 𝐻𝑖∗ of the interaction protocol to identify shared sensitive information
is essential in relation with participant entities 𝑒𝑗 .
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𝑞≤𝑄,𝑗≤𝑤,𝑡≤𝑇,𝑘≤𝑁

𝐻𝑖∗ ≡

(𝑆𝑞 , 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 )| (= (𝑆𝑞̿ 𝑜 (𝑀), 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 ) ^𝐼 𝑠 (𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ))

⋃
𝑞=1,𝑗=1,𝑡=1,𝑘=1

Introducing the proposed privacy protection-based framework at the interaction protocol
will extend only the necessary points in the interaction that might lead to a privacy concern.
In this respect, privacy protection will be maintained during the interaction, since the
messages and sequence will be privacy-protection based. Also, the shared information 𝐴∗𝑖
will be another concern that might disclose the sensitivity of the shared information. The
shared information by itself is considered non-sensitive information, but it can be used as
auxiliary information to transform implicit sensitive information to explicit.
𝑞≤𝑄,𝑗≤𝑤,𝑡≤𝑇,𝑘≤𝑁

𝐴∗𝑖 =

([𝑜], 𝐼𝑖,𝑘 )| (= (𝑜, 𝑆𝑞̿ 𝑜 ) ^𝑜̿ = 𝑆(𝐼𝑖,𝑘 , 𝑒𝑗 ))

⋃
𝑞=1,𝑗=1,𝑡=1,𝑘=1

The practicality aspect of the new privacy protection-based interaction protocol (𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃)
is a critical point of validation. The practicality is determined by the behavior of the
interaction protocol after the extension, which should maintain the same performance as
the original protocol toward achieving a task. Yet, the solution will be a privacy protection
based. The privacy protection-based protocol (𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃) needs to maintain the outcome of
the original protocol that it has been designed for. Applying the proposed privacy
protection framework through the interaction protocol will turn the sequences into 𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑚,
so as to narrow down the existence of others to only those entities that can maintain the
privacy protection. In a way, privacy protection requirements will be imposed as a
constraint in any proposed solution. Also, the termination of the utilized interaction
mechanisms after applying the privacy protection framework is a crucial point in
demonstrating the practicality of a proposed (𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃):
𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃 = < 𝑃𝐵_𝑀, 𝑃𝐵_𝑆𝑚 >
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5.2.3.1 Privacy Protection-Based Interaction Protocol
Termination
In the interaction protocol the released messages can contain a set of details that are carried
over during the interaction. Therefore, the message has to specify the sender and the
receiver, which defines the flow of the messages. Additionally, the messages flow through
sequences. The sequences orchestrate the pattern of the messages during the interaction,
which impose the order of the message flow.
𝐼𝑃 =< 𝑀, 𝑆𝑀 >
𝑀 = {𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑚 }, 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑍
𝑚𝑚 =< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑚, 𝐶𝑚 , 𝐶𝑠,𝑚 >, (𝐶𝑚 ∈ 𝐼𝑖 ), (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 ∈ 𝑂𝑠 )
𝑆𝑀 = [𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑞 ]
𝑆𝑀 < 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 >
During the process of assignment utilizing the 𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃, only the potential contractor who is
capable of handling the requested task within a specific privacy protection constraint will
be assigned. In such process the interaction protocol can get into an iteration process until
it finds the required maximum value. For instance, the service requester will look for which
one of the participants is the best to deliver the maximum value of the requested task.
Accordingly, the winner provider is determined and the termination point of the protocol.
The interaction protocol is designed to resolve the interdependency problem in the
interaction, to reach the desired solution among distributed multiple entities. Therefore, the
complexity behind the termination process is determining to be the “Best” potential
provider which can provide the requested solution to the assigned problem. By introducing
the concept of “Best”, the problem has been transferred to an optimization problem. By
natural, the optimization problem is (NP-Hard problem), and any interaction protocol has
an optimization problem. Naturally, in distributed space any interaction protocols such as
assignment protocol and negotiation protocol, they have an (NP-Hard problem) by default
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in the open environment. The optimal solution for an “optimization problem” is finding the
best “optimal solution” in an open environment. In such distributed space, there is no
centralized entity that has global knowledge about all the solutions that do exist in the
space. This demonstrates that a solution is distributed among the participant entities in the
space, each entity exposes part of the solution and entities need to negotiate to deliver the
requested solution.
The solution is exposed incrementally since there is no entity that has the overall
knowledge about all the participants who can help in such a space distributed naturally.
Therefore, the utilized interaction mechanism is the optimization problem of a distributed
space, where they are (NP-Hard) in general. Alternatively, utilizing a heuristic solution will
be acceptable for decentralized distributed space setting. Since the interaction protocol is
correlated to the interaction mechanism, the interaction mechanism will decide when the
protocol can be terminated. Nevertheless, the is approximate or near to optimal solution
would be acceptable, in which the approximate is better than random, as such the heuristic
solution is adopted.

5.2.3.2 Privacy Protection Interaction Protocol Outcome
Applying the privacy protection management framework on interaction protocols allows
us to identify the privacy concerns at the interactions. It evaluates the messages and
sequences and provides adequate protection operations within the interaction protocol that
result in privacy-based interaction protocol (PB_IP). The extended privacy-based
interaction protocol is generated by applying the privacy protection management
framework. The privacy-based extension does not affect the overall feasibility of the
original interaction protocol it still reaches the same outcome of the original interaction
protocol before applying the privacy protection framework. However, any solution that
was not achievable before the privacy protection extended protocol will not be attainable
after introducing the privacy protection protocol. Not all of the feasible solution that are
reached before the new extinction remain feasible after applying the framework. Not all of
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the available solutions will meet the privacy protection criteria after applying the privacy
protection extension. This makes it infeasible to reach all of the available solutions that
were available before the privacy protection extension.
The privacy protection management framework introduced the privacy protection
requirement as constraint variables in the solution space. In a way, any potential solution
that does not meet the privacy protection constraints will not be accepted. Consequently,
the solution space will be restricted only to the solutions that can solve the capability
interdependency issue and at the same time can handle the privacy preference among all of
the available solutions. Despite the fact that a solution space of an interaction protocol
before and after the framework extension has shrunk, any legitimate acceptable solutions
at the computation level require the inclusion of privacy resolutions for problem-solving
and coordination.
One of the main points that drive the practicality analysis is the attained outcome of the
interaction protocol before and after applying the privacy protection framework. The
solution outcome that can be attained after implementing the privacy protection base
interaction protocol should maintain the same original outcome. The privacy-based
interaction protocol is handling the same issue that the original interaction protocol was
dealing with. Yet, consider the privacy protection as a constrain of any solution.
The 𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃 is feasibly applied as a base for any privacy protection interaction. However,
the new privacy-base protocol is carrying a level of complexity. This complexity source of
the PB_IP yelled by the termination aspect of the interaction protocol. The termination is
driven by the interaction mechanism that the framework has introduced to it.

5.2.3.3 Privacy Protection Interaction Protocol Practicality
Analysis
The Privacy Protection Interaction Protocol (𝑃𝐵_𝐼𝑃) has different levels of complexity
depending on message redundancy. The first complexity level is the time complexity per
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message, which is based on the number of participants receiving the message flow to. As
such, it is measured by the number of repeated process for each message with each
participant that will result a Linear growth complexity. The second and most importantly
source of complexity is the termination of the interaction. The combination of all the
messages, sequences and the termination will demonstrate the overall complexity. Our
analysis of the interaction protocol will be divided into two main complexity levels, permessage and overall protocol time complexity.
Messages flow in a certain sequence, a flow that delivers the exchanged messages between
entities. Each message might have a different order of sequence than others. Each message
in the interaction protocol conveys content 𝐶𝑚 and a sequence 𝑆𝑀 to deliver this content.
𝑚𝑚 ≡< 𝑒𝑠 , 𝑒𝑚, 𝐶𝑚 , 𝐶𝑠,𝑚 >, ∈ (𝐶𝑚 , 𝐼𝑖 ) ∈ (𝑂𝑠,𝑚 , 𝑂𝑠 )
Sequences are constructed by patterns of exchanged messages. There is a specific list of
sequence (Order) of messages (𝑀) to follow to deliver an expected outcome of a certain
type of message.
𝑆𝑀 = [𝑚1 , … , 𝑚𝑞 ]
𝑆𝑀 < 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 >
The sequence structure is ordered as a (List pattern), which is not a (Set pattern), where the
flow in the (Set pattern) does not follow a parallel sequence. Yet, it has a set of orders that
can follow a specific pattern of sequences. In order for the messages to be delivered, there
will be operations that interfere with delivering this set of messages among the participant
entities. The carried-on complexity in the original sequence of the interaction protocol is
introduced by the delivery of the expected outcome that an interaction protocol meant for.
This is captured at two main levels aspects of complexity – per-message complexity and
set of messages complexity.
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Messages need to flow from the service requester (𝑒𝑠 ) to the service provider (𝑒𝑚 ) which
will initially remain (Linear Growth 𝑂(𝑛)) throughout the process of the interaction. The
same pattern will remain during the message delivery. However, complexity can be
affected by the increments of providers (𝑒𝑚 ) and the number of the flowed messages (𝑀)
between them. The initial state of the growth is (Linear Growth 𝑂(𝑛)), and it can be
impacted by a change it message number. The cycle of complexity growth is yielded for
each round, with each provider and each message in the two stages of classification. The
overall complexity for each message can be demonstrated as (𝑂(𝑛)). This complexity is
considered the lower bound for each of the two levels – message level and sequence level
– that the message can generate during the interaction cycle.
Capturing the pattern complexity that each message can go through during the interaction
at two levels will be illustrated, where it is measured in the context of the overall
communication of the interaction protocol. Our focus is mainly on the complexity behavior
when the “input size” increases with the interaction protocol. Input is modeled as the
participant entities / messages (the sequence). The overall complexity of the interaction
protocol will be mainly related to the overall message complexity and overall message
sequence complexity. The overall message complexity stage is correlated with the number
of the input messages during the interaction, where the lower bound complexity increases
with the increment of the potential provider complexity and this demonstrates the Linear
growth of the complexity behind all messages (𝑂(𝑛)). Meanwhile, the overall messages
sequence complexity at this stage is the lower bound the complexity demonstrate (𝑂(𝑛))
as well, since the growth of the complexity is related to the growth of the message in which
the number of the sequences are fixed.
The last stage the interaction protocol analysis is the overall protocol termination and
privacy solution determination complexity. The investigation is mainly about marking the
end point of a protocol that demonstrates the complexity of the protocol functionality.
Some protocols’ complexities are exponential, as they are as cyclic as the nature of the
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protocol, whereas a protocol can get into a (𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝) that results in a protocol that is
impractical, inefficient and not feasible; this can be different from one to another
interaction mechanism. Loop represents an exponential complexity growth, in which it
creates nondeterministic polynomial time (NP), if it presents a cyclic pattern “𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝”.
Accordingly, all mechanisms have their own distinct termination complexities, which are
not an absolute aspect for all of the interaction mechanisms.
The complexity is investigated overall on three levels: Message level, Sequence level and
Termination level. Complexity growth occur on the Message level and at the Sequence
level, but it is introduced as leaner growth overall on each of the levels. The complexity of
the Termination is captured from the protocol capability to solve the interdependency
problem without involving in an “endless loop”, while the protocol message sequence is
preserved in this original form. However, the conversion of the operation is repeated until
it achieves the expected solution. As such, this makes the interaction protocol an expensive
solution that would not be practical as an optimal solution, where what is produced has
exponential complexity growth. There are interaction protocols leaner by structure, as they
are not cyclic. For example, any form of list structure is considered Leaner. However, if
one of the nodes returns to one of the previous nodes, it would be considered cyclic and
the protocol would be a potential Exponential.

Practical Privacy Protection Computation Based
This work has introduced the proposed solution at two levels. The first level deals with the
main proposed privacy protection framework elements in practical terms, where the
proposed practical elements aspect has been introduced in the beginning of this chapter and
each of the elements has been introduced in a practical context. The second level is practical
computation-based privacy protection architecture. The key point of this level is the
practical privacy protection-based solution toward the computation aspect implementation
of the privacy protection-based framework, which can be illustrated from the entity level
and / or the platform level. As such, the lens of the practicality that is carried is the
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efficiency and feasibility aspects. By establishing the architecture aspects, whether at the
entity or platform level, the practicality of the proposed framework will be maintained. As
such, the proposed assumption is that the environment capability will be extended with the
privacy protection property, and so will be a privacy protection centric environment.
Going forward with the given analysis, it is practical to introduce the proposed framework
in an open environment where a limitation has been imposed by the nature of the
environment itself. Therefore, one of the proposed solutions is to elevate some of the
framework elements to be held by the platform itself. The proposed solution would not be
practical if the feasibility behind it has not been demonstrated, where the feasibility can
illustrate the ability of implementing such a solution in an environment is open by nature.
In this work, the feasibility will be assessed from the implementation of the Privacy
Protection Framework. The proposed solution will not be considered practical if it is not
feasible to demonstrate it at each of the mentioned computation architecture levels, where
the feasibility can illustrate the ability of implementing such a solution in an environment
that is open by nature. Carrying on the practical properties of the Privacy Protection
Framework, we elevate some of the framework elements to the environment itself, which
is the platform level, and the rest will remain at the entity level. In such a scenario the
complexity of the proposal will be measured partially at the platform and the other
framework complexity will be carried at the entity level itself, and this will be demonstrated
and elaborated on it within the details following the proposed solution.

Privacy Protection as an Architecture Computation.
Introducing the privacy protection computational concept as a base of interaction for the
participant entities will allow any entity that has joined the space to be privacy protected
by default. Due to the fact that entities in CDS have an interdependency problem for which
they need to interact in order to reach achieve their goal. The computation entity within
CDS can adequately be modeled a CIR-Agent that has knowledge, problem solving
capabilities, interactions and communications. Introducing part of the practicality
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architecture aspect as a computation element at the entity and / or at the platform can bound
the impracticality deficiency introduced through the proposed framework implementation.
As such, the practical implementation of the privacy protection can be achieved in
conjunction with problem solving and a coordinated solution, which can be managed by
interactions. The privacy protection interaction can be partially carried out by the platform.
By applying the framework, any solution that is achieved will not be acceptable if the
privacy concerns are not resolved. This can carry a cost of complexity that is introduced
when applying the framework, especially if carrying the proposed framework can impose
a burden on the participant entity, as it will not be practical at the entity level only.
The privacy protection management framework is applied at the computation level by
expanding the structure of the computational entity and the computational platform. The
privacy protection is given through the collaboration of both of the entities and platform
protection elements. In this dissertation, we have demonstrated a legitimate acceptable
solution at the computation level that requires the inclusion of a privacy resolution in
addition to the problem-solving and coordination through the interaction adhering the
privacy protection-based interaction protocol. Elevating part of the proposed framework to
the platform level in order to carry the practicality deficiency burden, if there is any yielded
by any of the main framework elements’ implementation.
The proposed privacy protection framework needs to be partially carried at the platform,
and the rest at the computational entity by extending the interaction part of the
computational entity and implementing it at the computational platform as well. The
comprehensive analysis of the proposed framework main elements, will demonstrate the
results of the practicality of each element, with the result that the practicality aspects of the
framework elements will identify which part can carry a complexity cost in the context of
communications and computations that need to be elevated to the platform level.
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5.4.1Communication and Computational Complexity
The implementation of the privacy protection framework within a specific architecture can
reduce the practicality complexity, since the nature of the open environment imposes an
impracticality aspect that makes the implementation in certain architectures inefficient,
difficult and imposes a communication impracticality aspect.
Equipping an entity with a privacy protection alone will not solve the impracticality issue
of the communication complexity deficiency per-say. As such, if the entity is privacyprotection aware but it still needs to interact with each existing entity in the environment
to solve its capability interdependency problem, in such an implementation, the framework
will be an overlap that limits an entity capacity against unpredictable capable participant
entities in the open environment in order to solve the interdependence problem. This will
add another level to the communication complexity among the participant elements as it is
demonstrated in Figure 8: Interaction among entities in open environment.

Figure 8: Interaction among entities in open environment
The communication complexity behind the previous architecture implementation is
resolved by introducing the mediator approach architecture. The Mediator, as shown in
Figure 9, is a plug-in entity, which is the first point of contact for all request by potential
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providers. The mediator architecture practically resolves the capability interdependency in
an open environment setting where requester entities are distributed, and they do not have
a complete knowledge of the environment and the potential capable providers.

Figure 9: Mediator architecture in open environment
In this work, the concept of the mediator has been adopted and introduced in the context
of the platform. The broker in our solution is one of the scenarios and has nothing to do
with the privacy protection and the proposed framework, where the broker itself has only
one functionality, which is a mapping mission, mapping the request to the potential
provider “capability”. Nevertheless, the platform will be the base of interaction for any
service and potential entity that participates in the space, which implies the privacy
protection at the platform architecture is a computational aspect, that can be imbedded is
an extension base of the platform in a way that the interaction becomes to be a privacybased interaction. By the time that any of the participant entities decide to utilize any of
the available services that live at the interaction platform, they will collaboratively interact
with each other through the privacy protection-based platform. The services, such as broker
or scheduler, do not affect the platform functionality per-say since all the mentioned
services are reached through the privacy protection-based platform and they will have their
privacy protection assessed before delivering any service.
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As a result of this investigation, the privacy protection was adapted through the platform
in a way that framework will be the base of interaction and an analytical tool containing
sets of formulated concepts that are essential for evaluating the state of privacy in
computational systems as shown in Figure 10: Privacy Protection Base Platform.

Figure 10: Privacy Protection Base Platform
Applying the privacy protection-based platform architecture in the open environment
utilizing the privacy protection management framework (PPF) principles, the exposure
boundaries and sensitive information for each entity will give the strict criteria that will
govern the interaction process, since in open environments entities do not have complete
knowledge about communicated information as well as all operations in other entities. This
demonstrates the necessity of capturing the privacy protection as an essential property at
the computation level and providing protection mechanisms required to incorporate
privacy protection during the interactions.
The communication architecture complexity will be bounded at two levels, the platform
level and entity level. The proposed privacy protection framework is partially carried out
at the computational platform, in a way such that the burden of interaction facilitation and
privacy mechanisms engine will be handled at the platform. As such that, the privacy
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protection is considered a base for any interaction in a way no interaction will be
established if it does not meet the privacy protection metrics that measure the protection
level, where the privacy protection metrics are governed by the participant entity utility.
Information utility is given by the entity and the privacy protection is provided by the
platform. Accordingly, the communication complexity will be reduced to the level that the
entity will carry the complexity of identifying the information utility and the platform
registration and interacting with it, whereas the task allocation is based on the privacy
protection according to the given entity preference.
At the computational platform, the interdependency problem is classified as capability
interdependency and the interaction device is the “assignment”. The capability mapping is
one of the platform’s main functionalities that maps the requester entities to the capable
requester providers who can consent to the privacy protection requirement that is imposed
by the privacy protection platform extension. From the privacy protection implementation
point of view, by applying the privacy protection as a base at the computational platform,
the computational entity does not need to handle privacy protection techniques
implementation. Yet, the information categorization and information exposure boundary
identification are the participant entity duty to be handled.
The proposed assumption will deliver the privacy protection-based platform as a trusted
universe. Nonetheless, the setting of the applied platform is assumed to trust what governs
the privacy of the participant’s entities. Such a setting is not necessarily that both of the
other two sides of the entities are not trusted where the platform carrying the necessary
privacy point of the attended entity is based on their applied preference Also, this approach
can be attainable in all CDS environments and their privacy models. The proposed platform
architecture provides an appropriate separation of responsibilities, allowing entities to
focus only on achieving their goal under the privacy protection umbrella that has been
introduced by the platform that models the solution and solves their problems without
carrying the privacy concepts of the privacy.
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The Practicality of the proposed solution has been demonstrated as: Feasibility and
Efficiency, for which the feasibility of the proposed solution is introduced in the context of
environment expansion, where the environment what we refer to as the platform, has been
extended with privacy protection engine impeded in a way such that handles part of the
proposed framework as a base of the interaction. Maintaining the main platform
computational functionality after the framework extension is demonstrating the feasible of
the proposed solution. On the other hand, efficiency is measured interims of the participant
matching and task allocation complexity. Separating the responsivity by elevating the
matching responsibility from the entity level to a platform level will reduce the complexity
to a level 𝑂(1 ∗ 𝑛) such that elevation, participating entities will not need to interact with
all of the participate entity in the environment, but it will only need to interact with the
computational platform 𝑂(𝑛). The platform will carry all the heavy computational load,
such as the capability matching and task allocation, while carrying the privacy protection
mechanism engine.

Figure 11: Privacy Protection based Platform
Figure 11: shows that the requester entity 𝑒𝑟 assign the task to the potential participant
providers 𝑒𝑝 based on its privacy protection preference that has been calculated through
the proposed privacy protection engine in relation with the potential providers.
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5.4.2 Computation Architecture Implementation
At this point, the privacy protection is geared toward providing a computational privacy
protection-based system throughout a computational entity and computational environment
modeled as CDS. In this dissertation, several key contributions and their implementation
have been practically assessed. As such, capturing the practical implementation of the
privacy protection framework (PPF) at the interaction level as a computational aspect.
Introducing the privacy PPF as a computational element will reduce the potential
interactions and shrink the solutions space to the level where only the participant entities
who can meet the privacy protection requirement can be selected. The PPF implementation
was established at two levels, the platform level and the entity level. The privacy protection
at the platform will provide a privacy aware computation system, and at the entity level
will transform any participant entity to a privacy-aware computation entity. In order to
build a privacy protection environment, the proposed PPF has been adopted as a modular
architecture that is utilized as a base of interaction among participant entities this present
in the open environment will maintain their privacy protection. This proposed solution it
is not enforcing a specific implementation scenario where it is enabling the privacy
protection mechanisms as a base for many computational services such as the scheduling,
brokering and many other applications. In this work, we are taking the broker as example
to evaluate and validate the practicality behind the proposed privacy protection
management framework.
Applying the PPF at the computation platform level will improve two main aspects. First
of all, the privacy-based platform will maintain the communication aspect where it will
carry all the coordination duty with a privacy protection base. As such, the coordination
gives a new dimension to communicating where the participant entities are not required to
know of each other to accomplish their goal while their privacy is maintained. This will
relieve the participant entities from the burden of coordination concerns. Thus, the entities
are left with more space and time for other computational activities to improve their
profitability and gain a competitive advantage. Injecting the PPF as an essential
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computational aspect level of the platform will govern the privacy protection based on the
requester entity decision that has been taken at the entity level based on the requester
entity’s privacy property after evaluating information categorization and its exposure
boundary that has been identified from the proposed information categorization engine at
the entity level. The platform introduces the released shared form of information the
privacy protection mechanism, before it establishes the interaction with the registered
potential provider. Privacy protection mechanism such as Differential Privacy protection.
The second phase as it is shown in Figure 12: Privacy protection based computational
platform is the direct interaction of the requester 𝑒𝑟 with the potential service provider 𝑒𝑝 .
At this level there is no intervention of the platform once the potential provider meets all
the privacy protection constrains that has been introduced at the platform level. However,

Figure 12: Privacy protection based computational platform
the PPF will extend the structure of the entity as well in a way that the participant entities
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will partially handle the PPF, the privacy protection engine will be carried at the entity
level to enable them to measure the sensitivity of their information and set their exposure
boundary of the released information in order for the requester 𝑒𝑟 entity to make a decision
to proceed forward with the interaction.

Figure 13: Privacy Protection Aware Entity

Summary
The proposed solution is a generic practical model, of the privacy protection framework at
the computational level and can address the privacy protection interaction between the
participant entities in the environment. Capturing privacy as a computation concept
necessitates incorporating the privacy protection within the computation the entity at
interaction level. The computation entity in the CDS environment requires resolving
interdependency problems through interaction. Treat the privacy concern at the
computation level will capture the forms of interactions that have the potential to result in
privacy violations. The proposed solution has practically reduced the privacy protection
concerns among the participant entities in the CDS environment.
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6

Privacy Protection Platform in CDS Model: Application
Scenarios

Many practical applications have been effectively modeled as CDS environments. They
are involved within various information system domains. Internet of Things (IoT) is one
example that can be effectively modeled as CDS where numerous services, information
sources, devices, and sensors are involved. Carrying on with this direction, a Smart-Space
is a research initiative at our innovation research lab, through which several studies,
analyses and investigations of several critical research issues have been conducted where
the privacy concerns and protection in open environments is at the top of the list of our
research priority at the lab. In this chapter, we elaborate on the practicality aspect behind
the implementation of the proposed privacy protection management framework through
utilizing the proposed privacy protection-based platform.

Smart Space Project
The Smart Space project is implemented as an IoT environment in CDS that utilizes a
computation integration platform, for which the proposed practical privacy protection
framework is partially embedded in the computational platform as a base of interaction for
any of the participant smart objects that are looking for a service or providing a service.
This will convert the platform to a privacy aware computational platform. Within this
environment entities are modeled as Smart Objects (SO) that are managed at the Smart
Object Platform (SoP). Services in this environment utilize the existing resources in the
space and deliver solutions to applications and services through the interaction. The
proposed platform introduces a set of services, such as a brokering layer, to provide
functionalities to integrate the resources of the smart space environment including data,
services, clouds and events. The proposed privacy protection framework has been
introduced through the extension of the CIR-Agent architecture. In order to adopt the
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proposed framework at the Smart Object (SO) architecture in the smart space need to be
mapped to CIR-Agent architecture in away the framework can be adequately implemented.

Figure 14: CIR- Smart Object Logical
Architecture

Each of the SOs is composed of knowledge and capability. The main elements of any of
the SOs are intelligence, decision and behavior; in this work, we are essentially dealing
with the behavior part where the interaction part exists. By mapping between the SO and
the CIR-agent:

Figure 15: Mapping the Smart Object to CIR-Agent
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Due to the interdependency problem among smart objects, they require the coordination of
their activities using interactions [32], [94]. In the message-based form of interactions,
smart objects autonomously interact and exchange information, which leads to privacy
concerns. In CDS, solutions are accomplished through the participation of several SOs
where each has only one part of the solution. This positions CDS as a computation platform
in which the computation occurs in entities’ interactions. This entails that privacy
challenges in CDS are the concerns associated with the computation happening at the
interaction level. This concern can be captured at two levels of privacy-based extension, at
the SO “entity” level and at the computation platform as well.
Interaction at the smart object is carried out by the interaction device that has two main
components, which are assignment part “Interaction Protocol” and the “Interaction
Mechanism”. The interaction device is responsible for managing the interaction and the
flow of information “into” and “out of” the smart object. Applying the privacy protection
management framework at the SO level will reduce the interaction to only SOs who can
meet the privacy property of the information owner, then the privacy is considered. By
applying the framework principles and giving the exposure boundaries, the sensitive
information can be captured. Also, the privacy protection management framework will be
responsible for identifying the concern points of the protocol and providing an adequate
privacy protection that can turn the interaction protocol to a privacy-based interaction
protocol. Utilizing the proposed privacy models and privacy protection management
framework as an analytical tool enables identifying the privacy concerns related to the
interaction protocol and equipping it with the necessary privacy protection operations.
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Figure 16: Smart object privacy-based interaction device
The other level of the privacy protection implantation at the platform level occurs when
the participant 𝑆𝑂𝑠 are registered with the platform in order to be mapped to the capable
potential contractor in the environment. The platform is positioned as a base for any
computational service, in which those computational services will be responsible for
managing the coordination among the participant 𝑆𝑂𝑠. Extending the computational
platform with privacy protection will set the privacy as an essential aspect for any
interaction between the requester 𝑆𝑂 and the computational service and between the
potential participant provider 𝑆𝑂𝑠 in an open distributed environment to deliver services.
In the Smart Space project, we have adopted the DEXIT computational platform, which is
an Integrated Channel Engagement (ICE) platform, that provides and supports all kinds of
engagements as a cloud base [26]. The interaction in the platform among the participant
entities occurs through the smart object platform (SOP). Any domain can be modeled and
managed through the business concept platform (BCP). According to the environment
settings, the privacy protection framework (PPF) can be adequately applied as a
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computational aspect at the interaction part of the smart object beside the interaction level
of the platform as well, which is the SOP.

Figure 17: Computational Engagement Platform "DEXIT"

Privacy concerns and protection in Smart Space
The motivation behind the smart space is to create an Internet of Things (IoT) environment
where a variety of autonomous smart objects (i.e., things) are networked to utilize and
provide services to the environment [7]. The participant smart objects, “things”, will be
able to communicate and interact with each other through the interaction to collect and
exchange data over a network with minimal human intervention [2]. Furthermore, the
future growth of IoT based applications is foreseen to be tremendous [12]. The
incorporation of social networks and ubiquitous computing technologies in IoT can easily
collect data about our personal characteristics and behaviors. For individuals and groups
of people, there are many advantages of interacting seamlessly with the environment
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incorporating IoT into their lives [75], [48], [30]. The comfort experienced via innovative
technologies in IoT is at the expense of privacy [68], [10], where the privacy of individuals
can be compromised in IoT. As such, a massive amount of personal information is observed
without informing users, let alone asking for their permission [10]. Consequently, the more
engagements involved among individuals with IoT based applications and their enabling
technologies, the more privacy concerns will arise [79], [80], [81].
As the smart space inherits the characteristics of IoT, the privacy challenge within this
environment will endure. Since the IoT is modeled as a CDS, privacy concerns and
protection occur during the interaction among smart objects that do exist in the space.

6.2.1Privacy Concern Scenarios
In the smart space, Smart Objects have their own goals that they pursue. Those 𝑆𝑂𝑠 need
to interact and share their capabilities in order to achieve the required goals. The goal
information 𝐼 𝑔𝑜𝑙 needs to be shared with the capable 𝑆𝑂𝑠 who can achieve the requested
goal. The shared 𝐼 𝑔𝑜𝑙 with a specific 𝑆𝑂 might be considered sensitive information if it has
been revealed to another set of 𝑆𝑂𝑠 that might introduce operations to extract implicitly
sensitive information from explicitly shared information. In this case, the information
needs to be managed and the potential participant 𝑆𝑂𝑠 need to be categorized based on
their relation with the shared information 𝐼 𝑖𝑛𝑡 in relation with the 𝑆𝑂𝑠 before it is shared.
Due to the exchange of information in interactions smart space, privacy becomes a concern
for all the participants.
In the smart space project, we have applied the education domain which is MyPLS (my
Personal Learning Space), which is mainly about enabling Active learning for E-learning.
MyPLS has a set of features that enable students and learners to create and manage their
learning space. Each of the participant can contact and establish conversations and/or
chatting about learning topics relevant to the group’s interest.
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There are a set of participants learner smart objects (𝑆𝑂𝑖 , … , 𝑆𝑂𝑡 , … , 𝑆𝑂𝑁 ) registered in the
platform, each of which 𝑆𝑂 has an interest and they need to get assistance in a specific
topic 𝐼 𝑡 , where there is a learner 𝑆𝑂𝐿1 that requires the topic resources 𝐼 𝑡 . The interest in
the required topic has been shared with everyone who has the same topic of interest
(𝑆𝑂𝑖 , … , 𝑆𝑂𝑡 , … , 𝑆𝑂𝑁 ). Executing operations on the shared interest 𝐼 𝑡 can extract a new
form of information that the 𝐼 𝑡 owner is not willing to reveal and might return with a
negative impact on the 𝑆𝑂𝐿1 , such as disseminating 𝐼 𝑡 of the 𝑆𝑂𝐿1 to another 𝑆𝑂𝑥 that does
not have the same topic of interest is raising the flag of privacy concern about SOL1 privacy
by manipulating the information about the interest and extracting an implicit form of
information that the 𝑆𝑂𝐿1 explicitly shared. This scenario is one of the forms of privacy
concerns, “Discrimination Privacy Concern”[88] , [89]. In such an environment, it is
essential that entities receive privacy protection while interacting with each other in finding
a mutual topic of interest.

6.2.2 Privacy Protection Platform based.
Given the earlier analysis of the proposed privacy protection framework implementation
at the computation level, the framework elements have been practically determined as a
computational concept that is partially applied at two levels; the entity level and platform
level, that will consider the privacy protection at all of the computational levels. This is
illustrated through the extension of the 𝑆𝑂 and extension on the platform as privacy based.
Introducing the first part of the solution by injecting the part of privacy protection
management framework at interaction level will allow smart objects to handle the decisionmaking process. In a way any 𝑆𝑂 can measure the chance of a privacy concern by
measuring the risk of interaction, which is directly related with the requester 𝑆𝑂
information utility in relation with the potential 𝑆𝑂𝑠. Therefore, it becomes a multi-
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objective problem to allocate proper protection operations with an adequate level of PPL
serving the expected utility and the requested task.

Figure 18 Smart Object Privacy Protection Aware
Capturing the proposed solution at the entity level will allow identifying privacy concerns
at the interaction protocol and evaluates the messages and sequences of the interaction
protocol and provides adequate protection operations within the interaction protocol that
result in a privacy-based interaction protocol. The extended privacy-based interaction
protocol that is generated by applying the privacy protection management framework can
sufficiently provide privacy protection in situations where the knowledge in the CDS
environment is incomplete.
The second level of the proposed solution is the computation privacy protection platform
base. The proposed platform will carry the burden of the coordination. The coordination is
maintained under the privacy protection propriety of the privacy protection framework.
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Participant 𝑆𝑂𝑠 do not need to be concerned with how the interaction and the coordination
are performed with potential 𝑆𝑂𝑠, in which the platform will manage capability-based
coordination while the assignment interaction protocol manages the brokering capability
of various 𝑆𝑂𝑠.
Extending 𝑆𝑂𝑠 with privacy protection is possible by injecting the proposed framework as
a computational aspect after applying the other part of the framework at the platform.
Having such an implementation will ensure that any interaction and solution will be based
on the privacy protection as a constraint. Also, the platform structure is extended along
with the other parts of the privacy protection framework. Under this implementation, any
of the participant entities are interacting through the privacy protection-based platform
after assessing its privacy protection at the 𝑂𝑆𝑠 level first and then proceeding to the
interaction with the privacy protection part at the computational platform.

Figure 19: Computational Privacy Based Engagement Platform
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Summary
The smart space project is defined as including a diverse set of entities to form an IoT
environment and is modeled as a CDS. “Entities” in this smart space are modeled as smart
objects (𝑆𝑂𝑠). Because of the increased involvement of people and their devices in IoT
applications, privacy has become a more complex challenge. Hence, we have applied
privacy protection-based smart objects that do exist on a privacy protection-based
environment in a smart space.
As smart objects in the open environments are autonomous and self-interested, it is
assumed that all entities will respect the privacy of each other. Applying the proposed
privacy protection framework (PPF) on the participant 𝑆𝑂𝑠 will transfer any 𝑆𝑂𝑠 to privacy
protection aware so as to deliver any solutions utilizing privacy protection-based platforms
that carry PPF as a base as well. This will provide the available solutions restricted only to
those that can accept the privacy constraints. Therefore, privacy becomes a quality factor
of any of the requested solutions.
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Privacy Protection-Based Implementation

7

The focus in this implementation is to provide a functional specification of CDS
(Cooperative Distributed System). In our implementation, applications and services are
connected and integrated through a computational platform. In which, it facilitates the
cooperation, interaction and integration among participant Smart Object (𝑆𝑂𝑠). Applying
the proposed privacy protection management framework will provide a reasonable privacy
protection as a computational concept.
Technically, we have chosen DEX computational platform, where all of the computation
services, such as web service and DB to be deployed at DEX platform. Also, all the
participant 𝑆𝑂𝑠 will interact with each other utilizing the platform. By introducing the
proposed privacy protection management framework partially at the 𝑆𝑂 and at the
computational platform, privacy concerns will be handled from following perspectives:
-

Sensitive information categorization.

-

Exposure boundary identification.

-

Privacy protection operation.

Experimental setup
This section describes the experimental setup:

7.1.1 Architecture Level
The main two rolls in our solutions that in our implementation that we are focusing on are
the Service Requesters and Service Providers, whom are interact and communicate through
computational platform utilizing the computation service such as brokering manager layer.
1) Service requester SO: Requesters interact with brokering layer through the
privacy protection management framework-based platform. During the interaction
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process, service requester will have the capability to make decision among multiple
providers’ proposals. After assessing the privacy protection requirement for each
of the participants providers according to the service requester.
2) Service providers SO: Providers have no direct interaction with the service
requester. At the first stage, the interaction in the beginning will interact through
the privacy protection-based platform. Second stage, direct interaction after the
privacy protection has been evaluated for each provider at two levels: the entity
level evolution and the platform level.

Figure 20: System Architecture
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7.1.2 Deployment Level
1) All the participant “requester” will be registered in DEX’ service broker.
Requestors in will only know the DEX’s host as the privacy protection-based
platform. In which, it hosts the broking layer as a computation service.
2) All potential providers modeled as smart object (𝑆𝑂) in DEX. The providers SOs
will receive a broadcasted task from one of the computation services that exist on
the computational platform.
3) All the of capable potential providers will response to the required task message.
The responded message includes the key identifier of each provider.
4) Responses will be collected by one of the computation services, ex. Broker, through
the privacy protection element of the framework at the platform. The collected
responses will be forwarded to the decision making SO cooperative with initial
requester to make a decision based on requester privacy preference.
5) In Heroku platform, another smart object to support encryption engine services will
be implemented and deployed.

Figure 21: Deployment Architecture
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7.1.3 Design Principle on Privacy Concerns
1) Build a computational privacy layer to deal with the request, response and
negotiation process, which can avoid direct interaction between the participant SOs.
This layer will lower the risk of information leaking and privacy concern.
2) All potential providers will register their service in brokering layer, which makes
the real request path and services are anonymous.
3) All potential providers are hiding their capability and will check the capability
based on the requested task.
4) During the request inquiring process, the requester explicit information has to be
reduced as possible as it can be. Normally, the ‘task ID’ is the explicit form of
information that is shared.
5) During the interaction, the task value will be encrypted; only the requester has the
authority to decrypt the task value for the potential winner provider by sharing the
encryption key.
6) All the capable selected providers will contact the Privacy Protection Layer, which
is specifically the Encryption SO, to get the encrypted task value. Then forward it’s
service id to the computational service, ex. Message Broker computational service.
The Brokering SO collects all bidding encrypted information and transfer to requester SO.
Requester SO need to contact Encryption engine at the platform to decrypt the task and
select the winner provider. Afterwards, winner provider interacts directly with the requester
SO to execute the task without the intervention of the platform.
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Figure 22: Privacy Protection-Based Interaction Protocol

Detailed Design and Implementation
Based on the previous designed scenario, the requester in Salesforce will send a
‘TaskRequest’ to ‘provider smart object’. The ‘provider smart’ will evaluate the bid details
and set their capability, synced back with Salesforce in real-time.
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1. Service registration in DEX platform
Request the TOKEN:
URL：https://sso.dexit.co/openam/oauth2/access_token?realm=/uwo.ca
Method: POST
Headers: Authorization: Basic ZHgtc2VydmljZToxMjMtNDU2LTc4OQ==
Content-Type: application/x-www.form-urlencoded
Body: grant type=password&username=asaleh45@uwo.ca&password=aaaaa

Figure 23: Service registration at the platform
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1.1 DEX Service Broker Registration:
URL：http://sb-a1.herokuapp.com/services
Method: POST
Headers: Authorization: Bearer 7cd44fa9-2414-4b74-8c50-0ab15be14fa2
Content-Type:application/json
Body：{"service_name": " Project-SO1-PB_SO",
"type":"restful",
"description":"",
"service_id":"",
"endpoints":{ "host":"smartsegment-object-1.herokuapp.com",
"protocol":"http",
"port": 80,
"path":"/sb/segment"

}

Figure 24: Service broker registration
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1.2 DEX Service Execution
1. Add service id in URL
2. Put TOKEN in headers
URL：http://sb-a1.herokuapp.com/execution/707844e7-33ba-43fc-bd5775d9fed96239
Method: POST
Headers: Authorization: Bearer e8510aca-6e53-41ee-8735-f81c3464f256

2. Requester smart object: Salesfoce.com + decision-making SO in
Heroku
-

All the requesters start resaving the task request after collecting the (TaskRequest)
announcement, and they response back with can send the segment update request
to start the interaction.

-

The service requester will revise the service description from Brokering layer has
been registered in DEX and service id is saved in salesforce side and get ready to
be called anytime.

Figure 25: Requester Smart Object
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3. Brokering layer: DEX platform + CNP Smart Object in Heroku
All service providers’ entry services will be registered in DEX and saved in Heroku as a
CNP SO’s. After they receive the request, the CNP SO will broadcast the request to
potential providers with task ID and requester ID.

Figure 26: Platform Brokering Layer
Once receiving the bidding values from capable potential providers, the CNP SO will
collect the bidding values and accordant service id and forward to requester’s decisionmaking SO.

4. Decision-making SO with requester
Once receiving the bidding values from brokering layer, the requester’s decision-making
SO will interact with encryption SO to decrypt the bidding values then select the winner
provider with the accordant service ID. Requester will forward its request with winner’
service ID to execute the service and get the result.
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5. Service Providers in Heroku
After receiving the task notice from CNP SO, the provider will check its own capability, if
it is capable to solve this task, the encrypted bidding value will be generated through
interacting with encryption SO to retrieve the key and register the trusted requester id.
-

Capability registered table:

Figure 27: Capable Potential Provider

6. Smart Object for encryption
In this SO the accordant keys mapping to specific service provider are saved, we can define
different encryption algorithm to offer encrypt or decrypt service.

Figure 28: Encrypt and Decrypt Service
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7. API and Services List in Heroku platform with Node.js.

Table 1: API and Services Content List.
The model can be applied in different ‘smart space’ domains that is an open environment
based and its entities required a cooperation and need to interact with other entities to solve
their problem. The architecture is fitting in the agile development without concerning
infrastructure, since the applications and database can be deployed in cloud base platform
such as Heroku. In such, the integration and scalability with the privacy-based platform
would be easier since the framework is introduced as add-ons to any platform.
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8

Conclusion and Future Work

The aim of the research presented in this dissertation is to define a generic practical
treatment of “privacy concern” as a computation concept in CDS paradigm that is
implemented as practical privacy-aware solution. The formal model of privacy protection
is practically introduced as a base for privacy protection management framework for CDS.
This has been served at two different levels of privacy protection, which are privacy-aware
agent model and privacy-based computational platform for CDS that enables privacy
protection at the interaction level. In addition, based on the privacy protection management
framework the interaction protocol has been practically delivered as privacy base
interaction protocol.

Contributions summary
Entities in distributed systems such as CDS are autonomies and has a level of authority to
interact and exchange information during the interaction to achieve individual or collective
goals [32], [94]. Due to interdependency Information exchange through the interaction of
autonomous and self-interested entities. Thus, this raise the privacy concern that can occur
behind such exchange of information and the operations that might be executed on it [71],
[56]. This work has contributed in several aspects of these areas, which is shared with
privacy protection in information management, uncertainty level of privacy protection
identification, privacy concepts and practical information categorization within multiagent systems and practical privacy protection management framework implementation at
computational level.

8.1.1Challenge and Contributions
Despite the rapidly growing development of applications, user’s privacy is becoming a
critical issue. Thus, distributed systems architects, developers and administrators are facing
the challenge of securing user’s privacy as well as the services they might access. Privacy,
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by nature is a concept that is defined with many denotations, which could be interpreted
differently in various contexts. Understanding privacy as a concept that can be applied in
contexts such as CDS requires formal analysis of settings in which privacy is not negligible.
Our major contribution in this work is to introduce a practical privacy-aware computation
in open Cooperative Distributed Systems that addresses and manages privacy at the
interaction level. This has been introduced at three levels: First of all, verifying the
legitimacy of the achieved solution after applying the privacy as constrain. Secondly,
impose privacy protection in the solution as a computation concept. To resolve privacy
concerns in CDS, it is essential that privacy is modelled in a context that is adequate for
CDS environments. Third, assess the practicality of the proposed solution of intruding it at
the entity level and at the platform level. Modeling privacy in information management
context can be categorized as information collection, information processing and
information dissemination through which it can adequately be applied in CDS
environments. Due to dynamicity of the open environments, architectural-based
approaches are more desirable for CDS environments. For which, in this work we pursue
the computation view on privacy protection solution within the information management
context and adopt the architectural-based solution approaches by applying the model at the
interaction level at the entity level and at the platform level.
In this work a practical implementation of the formal model for privacy concern in an
information management context is presented. Where it has dealt with the privacy concern
as a critical issue in decentralized environments since there is no centralized control and
knowledge in the open environment, where both of them are distributed among
autonomous, self-interested entities and they need to adopt message-based interactions
through which information is shared. “Sharing” is a supervised process by entities, and as
such depending on the receiver of the information, the entity does not share the information
that is classified as sensitive. Privacy concern in this work molded as sensitive information
can be sensitive in relation to an entity and become non-sensitive in relation to another.
That will identify the state exposure boundary for which information that can demonstrate
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the sensitivity of information with other existed participant entities in the space. Due to the
incomplete knowledge of entities in CDS, we addressed the uncertainty level of privacy
protection in quasi mechanisms, a probabilistic model is utilized that reflects conditional
probability of privacy protection given the information that exists at the entity. This
concept is addressed as Privacy Protection Level (PPL).
Within this work, we have applied the privacy protection management framework partially
at the computation level by expanding the structure of the entity and elevating and elevate
the rest at the computational platform to include privacy protection management that
adheres to the privacy-based interaction protocol.

this demonstrate that legitimate

acceptable solutions at the computation require the inclusion of privacy resolution inaddition to problem solving and coordination.

Future Work
The contributions scoop in this work were molding the privacy concern, categorize
information in relation with potential participant entities, identifying an information
exposure boundary in context of open environment, practicality analysis of the proposed
privacy protection management framework under the focus of feasibility and efficiency,
and providing a practical implementation of the privacy protection management framework
to introduce a privacy protection aware entity and privacy protection base platform. This
work can be expanded within the area of economic-based privacy model and optimization
of privacy protection management. Economic mechanisms are adequate models for
managing interactions in decentralized systems. There are many research works attempt to
adopt the economic mechanisms to solve complex decision problems in CDS [87], [96].
Modeling privacy using economic based approaches can provide alternatives in which
entities willingly consider the privacy of others. Because entities are economically rational,
the expected outcome is the elimination of the chance of executing operation that
transforms non-sensitive information into sensitive. Therefore, the solution to privacy can
behave as perfect protection mechanisms [12][75][48][30].
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